TERRORISM-MIDDLE EAST
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TERRORISM-WHAT AND WHY?

Prologue. I have been interested in "terrorism" for years. In my training to become an infantry officer, and later on in my Vietnam experience, the concept of terrorism became patently clear. The Viet Cong frequently used terror as a tactic to control the populace while the U.S. military trudged along in its use of conventional weapons and tactics to continually win tactical engagements but forfeit positive political success. In fact, the U.S. was often portrayed as the perpetrator of terrorism. The naked little Vietnamese girl running from the napalmed village comes to mind. During the 1960s and 1970s domestic terrorists reared their ugly heads. The Weathermen and the Symbianese Liberation Army (Patty Hearst’s associates) may refresh your recollection. Local groups of terrorists posed newer and often more complex and lethal threats to the U.S. military guarding installations and equipment and to the F.B.I. and local law enforcement agencies protecting the public.

Because of my experience, training, and knowledge, I used to teach classes on terrorism to military and law enforcement personnel. For years, I have been a proponent of improved counter-terrorism intelligence, tactics, and national policies. The "skyjacking" of airliners caught the media’s (hence, the public’s) attention of how foreign nationals were willing to engage in terrorism and die for their cause as it related to what they believed were injustices caused by the United States and its ally, Israel, in the Middle East. The tensions between Israel and the Arab states and Islamic factions in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan undeniably are the main reasons for the terrorists acts against Israelis and Americans. This essay discusses in "straight talk" what terrorism is , why we are experiencing more of it, and how we can greatly diminish it. The focus will be on Middle East terrorism.

Definition of "terrorism". Over the years, many definitions of terrorism have been devised in various jurisdictions and as the results of various studies. I shall provide two.

Terrorism is the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain political, religious, or ideological goals by instilling fear or using intimidation or coercion. (Army Regulation 190-52 as cited in Training Circular 19-16, April 1983).

This definition has been the standard for countering terrorism on U.S. Army installations for years. When one understands this definition, one understands the intent of terrorists--using violence or the threat of violence to attain political, religious, or ideological goals. The terrorists do so by instilling fear or using intimidation or coercion. If the actions of the perpetrators do not meet the previously stated criteria, there may be the actions of crazies or criminals, but not the actions of terrorists. There must be the intent to attain political, religious, or ideological goals by instilling fear. The Viet Cong did it when they killed village chiefs to dissuade the rural Vietnamese populace from supporting the Americans. The radicals of the 1960s and the 1970s did it to dissuade support for the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Jews did it when they killed Palestinians and British civilians and military in order to take over the land previously occupied by the Palestinians. The Palestinians did it to protest the Jewish takeover and continued occupation of their homeland and to prevent further encroachments by Jewish "settlements". Muslim fundamentalists did it to challenge the actions and policies of the United States and Israel because of the U.S. support of Israel and U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia.

Arguably, the United States and Israel also engaged in "terrorism" when they conducted bombing missions across international boundaries of "suspected" terrorist camps killing innocent civilians or tortured and killed captured Palestinians. A precise understanding of the definition of terrorism and an intelligent and fair policy relating to countering terrorism is crucial if the United States is to maintain its credibility with the other nations of the world and if the United States and some of its leaders do not want to become the subjects of criminal prosecution before some future international criminal court.

The second definition of terrorism relates to criminal prosecution in federal district courts under the jurisdiction of the United States of America. 18 U.S.C. §2331, "Definitions" says:

As used in this chapter--
  (1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that--
         (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that
   are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State,
   or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
   of the United States or of any State;
         (B) appear to be intended--
            (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
            (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation
            or coercion; or
            (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination
            or kidnaping; and
         (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
   United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means
   by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to
   intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
   or seek asylum...

This definition becomes more important as the U.S. asserts its domestic criminal law jurisdiction over international boundaries and an emerging International Criminal Court wrestles with the creation of definitions of war crimes and terrorism.

18 U.S.C. §2332b(1) describes offenses to include killing, kidnaping, maiming, and committing an assault which resulted in a serious bodily injury. 18 U.S.C. §2332b(2) describes the jurisdictional bases. 18 U.S.C. §2332c discusses the use of chemical weapons as a prohibited act.

The reason why we must be concerned with how we define terrorism and how we take actions against it is so that we do not lose our credibility with the rest of the world, and more importantly, so that the U.S. never becomes accused of or prosecuted for engaging in terrorism.

What are terrorists’ goals?: As previously discussed, terrorist groups are not new. The goals of terrorists are as varied as there are groups. For example, in reviewing a publication, Domestic Terrorism, prepared by the National Governors’ Association (1979), I found listed:

• NWLF (New World Liberation Front)--active in California, Oregon, Washington, and Colorado;
• FALN (Fuerzas Armada de Liberacion National Puertorriquena)--active in Chicago, New York City, and Washington, D.C.;
• GJB (George Jackson Brigade)--active in Oregon and Washington State;
• JAR (Jewish Armed Resistance)--active in New York City;
• WUO (Weather Underground Organization)--active nationally;
• Cuban Commandos, anti-Castro Cubans--active in southeast United States;
• Croatian National Resistance--active in Chicago, Illinois area;
• KKK (Klu Klux Klan)--active nationally. There were also numerous other known terrorist groups active at that time. One can tell some of their goals just by their names. These groups were domestic terrorist organizations operating on U.S. soil, but we learned that terrorists would strike at U.S. personnel wherever and whenever they could.

In 1983 there were the bombings of a U.S. Embassy and a Marine barracks in Beriut, Lebanon in which 304 people were killed. In 1986 a Berlin, Germany disco was bombed, and two U.S. servicemen were killed. In 1988 the bombing of a Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland killed 270 people. In 1993 the World Trade Center in New York was bombed in a terrorist attack. In 1998 while Americans were preoccupied with knowing whether or not Bill Clinton, the President of the United States, got a "blow-job" from Monica Lewinsky, the U.S. Embassy in Kenya and the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania were bombed. All of these terrorist acts were done by Arabs or Muslim fundamentalists.

Why have these acts being committed? What are the goals of these Arabs or Muslims? Remember, all Arabs are not Muslim, and all Muslims are not Arab. For example, although Iranians, Pakistanis, and Afghans may be Muslims, they are not Arabs. Many Americans don’t know these distinctions, and that is a big part of the problem. We don’t know or care about them; they don’t know or care about us. That is a big reason our intelligence capabilities are so lousy in the Middle East. We have few professionals who speak Arabic or understand the Arabic or Islamic culture, history, or religion. So what do these people want?

• obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for "the cause" (e.g., justice for Palestinians, stop the Israeli settlements, dissuade the U.S. from continuing to support Israel with billions of dollars each year and with United Nations Security Council votes, get the U.S. out of Saudi Arabia);
• cause government reaction, overreaction, and repression leading to immediate public dissension (e.g., tighter security at embassies, increased expenditures for construction on them, armed guards outside the Pentagon, increased security at airports, law enforcement overreaction causing violation of privacy and other civil rights);
• harass, weaken, or embarrass government, military, or other security forces;
• show a government’s inability to protect its citizens;
• demonstrate power or threat credibility; or
• prevent or delay executive decisions or legislation. (See Training Circular 19-16, p. 1-7, April 1983).

The whole world knows that President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes on suspected terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan which were " linked" to Osama bin Laden who is believed to be behind the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The U.S. retaliation raised many questions--was there an immediate threat to justify this action on "suspected" terrorists, at a "suspected" terrorist meeting, at a "suspected" terrorist camp? If the Sudanese lab truly had deadly chemicals which were a threat to U.S. personnel, why weren’t they destroyed long ago? If the "terrorists" were adequately identified to justify bombing across international boundaries, why were they not sought out to be prosecuted as terrorists by the U.S. or United Nations? Was the Sudanese chemical laboratory-factory truly making chemicals which were a threat to U.S. citizens or anyone else? We may never know the truth, but doesn’t the fact that the questions exist cast serious doubt on the moral or legal justification of bombing foreign countries? Using criminal law terms--there was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt; there was no probable cause; there was not even reasonable suspicion. Those bombings did not and will not stop "terrorism" and were acts of terrorism, themselves. The rest of the world knows this.

Some long range goals of the Middle Eastern terrorists might be to:

• cause dramatic changes in government (e.g., put America at odds with the Arab and/or Muslim countries);
• influence national or international policy decision making (e.g., cause the U.S. to modify its support of Israel in terms of monetary, military, and United Nations support); and
• gain political recognition as the legal body representing an ethnic or national group (e.g.,as the Jewish Haganah and Irgun and the Palestine Liberation Organization did for their causes).

Why are Middle Eastern terrorists attacking U.S. citizens? There is no simplistic answer to this question, but many inferences can be drawn from the relationships among the Americans, the British, the Israelis, the Arabs, and the Muslims. A student of history will recall that the Crusades pitted the European Christians against the Moslems in the Holy Land (Palestine). The Moslems were engaged in a Holy War (Jihad) to ward off the infidels (the Christians). The Moslems succeeded in driving the invaders from their land; hence, they won. After the Crusades, various tribal chieftains and families ruled various parts of what we know of today as the Middle East; and the Turks (Ottoman Empire) also reigned for a while until the Arab countries, as we know them today, were established after World War I. I personally believe that there is still some of that "Christians versus Moslems" mentality prevalent in the U.S. today, partially because of prejudice and ignorance and partially because of the strong Jewish influence in the media, the entertainment industry, and now the United States government.

The history of America stems from a European frame of reference--the Pilgrims were European; the original colonies were tied to England; and Americans have had a history of treating people of color differently --blacks or African-Americans, Hispanics, American-Indians, Orientals, and most recently, Arabs or other Southwest Asian peoples. America, a nation founded with the principle that subjugating "colored people" to slavery was acceptable, still has its prejudices.

Americans’ prejudices against the "Arabs" intensified over the last fifty years as a result of the influence of the development of Israel and the efforts of some militant Jews from within and outside Israel. A brief history of how Israel took over Palestine helps one understand why "terrorists" are directing their efforts against U.S. citizens, today.

The rise of Israel or "The Palestine Problem". The Palestine problem is not new. Ever since the Romans destroyed the Judean state centuries ago, Orthodox Jews continued to hold spiritual claims to the Holy Land. Over the centuries a desire for a Jewish homeland grew, and Jews migrated to Palestine. In the 1870s, a wave of anti-Semitism spurred a new migration from central Europe, and in 1898 , Theodor Hertzl organized a Zionist international movement to establish in Palestine a home for the Jewish People secured by public law. (See War In The Shadows, The Guerrilla In History, by Robert B. Asprey, p. 551, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1994). The only problem with Hertzl’s plan was that thousands of Palestinians were living in Palestine and their descendants had done so for centuries.

In about 1900 there were about 40,000 Jews in Palestine. In a 1922 census there were about 591,000 Muslims, 73,000 Christians, 9500 "others", and 84,000 Jews populating Palestine. (See Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, by Issa Nakhleh, Vol. I, p. 25, Intercontinental Books, New York, 1991). The Balfour Declaration pledged England’s support of Zionist goals in order to win support of international, especially American, Jews to the Allies during World War I. In 1916, one year prior to the Balfour Declaration, a secret agreement was made between the British War Cabinet and Zionists leaders promising the latter a "national home" in Palestine in consideration of their efforts to bring the United States into World War I on the side of Great Britain. ( Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, pp. 1-2).

The Paris Peace Conference and subsequent conferences made Palestine become a British mandate. The League of Nations approved, and more Jews invaded Palestine. Palestine Arabs resented this "invasion" or "immigration" (however one looks at it) into their homeland. In 1920 Arabs and Jews fought over land disputes. In 1929, an anti-Jewish nationalist, the British- appointed Mufti of Jerusalem, incited attacks against Jews. The British tried to maintain a precarious peace, but Hitler’s anti-Semitic policy increased the influx of Jews into Palestine and caused further Arab resentment. The Jewish population continued to rise to nearly half a million in 1935. The Arab rebellion started in 1936 and continued to expand until a major British Military effort suppressed it two years later. (War in the Shadows, p. 552).

Various commissions studied the problem and usually recommended partition--the creation of a small, separate Jewish state. Arab countries objected; and because of their perceived importance to the forthcoming world war, Britain supported them. When war broke out, the international Zionist organization and its executive, the Jewish Agency, supported Britain. So did the Jews in Palestine. During the Arab rebellion in 1936-39 the Jews had a voluntary militia organized in local units primarily for local defense--the Haganah. In 1941 the British allowed the Haganah to organize full-time guerrilla shock units for the fighting in Syria; but the British policy discouraged a separate Jewish military force. (Id., p. 553). In 1942, Zionist leaders met in New York’s Biltmore Hotel to devise the Biltmore Program which called for unlimited immigration of Jews to Palestine which, after the war, would become a Jewish commonwealth state. The war strengthened the Haganah’s military arm. Thirty-two thousand Palestine Jews served in British forces, and in 1944 the British authorized a separate Jewish Brigade Group. The Group dissolved at the end of the war, but an underground Haganah army continued to exist. It was commanded by a cadre of four hundred professional soldiers; it had Palmach guerrilla units of about twenty-one hundred men and women, backed by a ready reserve; and it had widespread territorial militia of about thirty thousand with many thousands of covert supporters. (Id., p. 553). Militarily trained and experienced and motivated Jews were ready, willing, and able to take the Arabs’ land from them. And they did over time; and they still are via their Jewish "settlements".

In 1935 militant Zionists (as though the Zionists were not already militant), who had formed the Revisionist Party in 1925, splintered from the World Zionist Organization. Two years later younger Revisionists formed a militant force, the Irgun. The Irgun concentrated first on smuggling illegal refugees into Palestine. Arab attacks on Jews in 1939 caused the Irgun to open a terrorist campaign against the general Arab population. (Id,.p. 554). The Chamberlain White Paper of 1939, which greatly restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine, prompted the Irgun to target the British for murder. David Raziel and Abraham Stern, Irgun members, were arrested by the British and later released although they were terrorists. Stern disagreed with Raziel’s wartime policy of truce with the British so in 1940 he split from the Irgun and formed the Lokhammei Kherut Israel (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), or FFI--also known as the Stern Gang. (Id., p. 554). The Stern Gang, who were clearly "terrorists", by anyone’s definition, fought the British by eliminating some Jewish moderates and gentiles; and anyone who opposed creation of a Jewish state became fair game. This was really organized terrorism long before the Arabs ever bombed a bus or hijacked an airliner.

Stern, the criminal that he was, was killed by police bullets in 1942. A year later, another criminal and fanatic believer in a Jewish state, Menachem Begin, took command of the Irgun. From 1939 to 1943 the Stern Gang continued a policy of indiscriminate terror. In 1944, continued British refusal to accept the Biltmore Program caused the Irgun to renounce its truce with the British and to form a loose, sometimes uneasy, alliance with the Stern Gang in a new "war" for the Jewish state. By early autumn, the Stern Gang had murdered fifteen men, mostly moderate Jews, and destroyed several important government installations including four police stations. (Id., p. 555). That was terrorism. A great many Jews, in and out of Palestine, disagreed with the terrorism of the Irgun and Stern Gang on humanitarian grounds and out of concern for reprisals. The Jewish Agency’s security forces had to even wage war against the Irgun.

In May 1945, after the German surrender, the Jewish Agency wrote Prime Minister Churchill demanding the full and immediate implementation of the Biltmore resolution, the cancellation of the White Paper, the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish state, Jewish immigration to be an Agency responsibility, and reparation to be made by Germany in kind beginning with all German property in Palestine. The Palestinians seemed to have no say in any of this. The British stalled, and the Haganah engaged in extensive smuggling. In October 1945 Haganah’s clandestine radio station, Kol Israel, declared the beginning of "The Jewish Resistance Movement". On October 31, 1945 the Jews in Palestine attacked three small naval craft, wrecked railway lines, attacked a railway station and an oil refinery. In June 1946 Jewish terrorists committed more sabotage in Palestine. They destroyed twenty-two RAF planes at one airfield. The Haganah agreed to an Irgun attack on British headquarters in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. The bombings killed ninety-one British, Arab, and Jewish people and wounded forty-five. The British retaliated by raiding the Irgun headquarters in Tel Aviv. By the end of 1946 the Irgun-Sternist groups had killed 373 persons. The Haganah had supposedly disassociated itself from the terrorists, but the terrorists continued to operate with at least tacit support of a large part of the citizenry. (Id., p. 558).

The British still continued efforts toward a political compromise. The UN appointed a special committee, UNSCOP, to investigate the situation and recommend a solution. Meanwhile a reign of terror and counter-terror dominated Palestine. The British execution of Dov Gruner, a popular young terrorist who murdered a policeman, caused widespread Irgun reprisals. The Jewish terrorists attacked British installations and in one day killed eighty British soldiers. The British replied by declaring martial law which infuriated the civilian population but did not halt Irgun operations. (Id., p. 559). In July, 1947 the refugee ship Exodus 1947 arrived with forty-five hundred Jews aboard, only to be sent Back to Europe. This event gave militant Jews an enormous propaganda victory further exploited by Leon Uris’ best-selling novel Exodus.

The terrorism and counter-terrorism continued, and the UN committee worked throughout the summer and autumn and ultimately recommended an end to the British mandate in favor of another partition plan. The Jewish Agency reluctantly adopted the plan when the British made it clear that they intended to yield the mandate and withdraw troops in the near future. In late November 1947, the UN accepted the plan. The Arab League responded by ordering attacks against Jewish settlements in Palestine and throughout the Middle East. In December 1947 Great Britain announced that it would terminate its mandate on May 15, 1948. The Arab-Israeli war had begun. (Id., p. 561). The Palestinian Arabs and the rest of the Arab world were not happy with the theft of Palestine by the Jews with the complicity of Great Britain and the United States. (Note: See also Theft of a Nation, by William W. Baker, Defender’s Publications, Las Vegas Nevada, 1984, addendum 1989).

Zionism has corrupted America. It is important to define what is meant by this statement. "Zionism", as used in this context, refers to the use of "terrorism", murder, theft, sabotage, espionage, and undue and improper political influence to create and further support a homeland for the Jewish people. All Jews are not bad people. Most Jews are probably good people, as are other people, generally speaking; but any religious or ethnic group who used or uses terrorism as part of their tactics to accomplish their political, religious, or ideological goals or who aids and abets in doing so is wrong! The United States is not without fault in this regard.

As Israel was emerging as a state, members of Congress and Jewish organizations pressed President Truman to support immigration of Jews to Palestine. He pressured the British to permit immediate entry of additional 100,000 Jews from Europe into Palestine. Some private Jewish Americans and Jewish members of Congress also warned the British that they may not get American financial aid to rebuild their country after the war if they did not allow the immigration. Some of Truman’s advisors warned him not to create animosity between the United States and the Arab states and the Muslims inhabiting a strategic arc stretching from Morocco on the Atlantic Ocean across North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southern Asia as far as the present states of Malaysia and Indonesia on the Pacific rim. Truman told them, "I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents." (See Stealth PACs: How Israel’s American Lobby took Control of U.S. Middle East Policy, by Richard H. Curtiss, p. 18, American Educational Trust, Washington , D.C., 1990). Truman recognized the new Jewish state only eleven minutes after the British mandate ended and the existence of Israel was proclaimed. He set the standard for Congressmen and Presidents to come.

American politics is corrupted by Zionism. AIPAC ( American Israel Public Affairs Committee) gives political guidance and provides more than eighty pro-Israel PACs set up by Jewish organizations or community groups to raise and funnel campaign funds to friendly candidates. (Id., " Foreword: The Legal Complaint Against AIPAC"). But there is no Jewish conspiracy, is there? AIPAC puts the fear of God, or in this case, the fear of Israel, in candidates running for the U.S. Congress. (Id., p. 144).

Here is how AIPAC operates: At AIPAC conventions, members are encouraged to provide early money to anointed candidates--those who support Israel. Friendly candidates in trouble are targeted to insure they understand who is contributing and why. Many individual Jewish donors make their donation to the candidate’s campaign, but mail the check to a pro-Israel organization. There, it is "bundled" with checks from like-minded donors and delivered to the candidate by an officer of the organization so that the candidate understands where his money came from and how he is to vote regarding issues relating to Israel. (Id., p. 144).

The obvious result is that Congressmen assume that individual Jewish donors will be informed in advance as to exactly where each local and national candidate stands on Israel, and on election day Jewish voters will be willing to cast their votes on that issue alone. Many members of Congress still seem out of touch with the changing opinions on the Middle East among their own non-Jewish constituents, most of which are not one-issue voters on Middle East policy. Few members are able to ignore the demanding lobbyists of AIPAC, or to request answers about violations of U.S. laws both by the lobby and by its intransigent Israeli client. (Id., p. 144). This is the area where campaign finance reform is definitely needed, but not one of our illustrious Congressmen dares to deal with it. Instead Congress aids and abets in the corruption of our political process and our foreign policy.

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, Iraq, formerly an ally of the U.S., attacked Kuwait after supposedly receiving a tacit or ambiguous expression of indifference to its proposed actions from Ambassador April Glaspie. President George Bush wrestled with the idea of invading Iraq for a lot of disingenuous reasons until he decided it was to rescue Kuwait, but he laid the groundwork first. He got U.N. resolutions approving military action; he built a coalition of countries to support his actions; he used economic sanctions; and he sought support from Congress to use American military forces in Iraq. All of the members of Congress were not enthusiastic about giving the President a resolution supporting military action. Many wanted to give the sanctions more time. Saddam Hussein proposed withdrawing from Kuwait if the United States would consider the Palestinian problem which related to the allegations that Israel was occupying territory in Palestine in violation of United Nations’ resolutions. American Jews did not want "linkage" of the two issues, and the Jewish influence in Congress through AIPAC pressured Congress to give Bush the authority to commit U.S. troops to combat in Iraq. (See "Pro-Israel Lobbyists Quietly Backed Resolution Allowing Bush to Commit U.S. Troops to Combat", Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1991, pp. A14-A15).

Probably, one of the best ways to demonstrate Congress’s bias toward Israel is to consider a list of rhetorical questions. Which country in the Middle East has nuclear weapons? Which country in the Middle East refuses to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and bars international inspections? Which country in the Middle East seized the sovereign territory of other nations by military force and continues to occupy it in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions? Which country in the Middle East routinely violates the international borders of another sovereign state with warplanes and artillery and naval gunfire? What American ally in the Middle East has for years sent assassins into other countries to kill its political enemies ( a practice sometimes called "terrorism")? In what country in the Middle East have high ranking military officers admitted publicly that unarmed prisoners of war were executed? What country in the Middle East refuses to prosecute its soldiers who have acknowledged executing prisoners of war? What country in the Middle East created almost a million refugees and refuses to allow them to return to their homes, farms, and business? What country in the Middle East blew up an American diplomatic facility in Egypt and attacked a U.S. ship--The U.S.S. Liberty--in international waters killing 33 and wounding 177 American sailors? What country in the Middle East employed a spy, Jonathan Pollard, to steal classified documents from America and later give some of them to the Soviet Union? What country has made Pollard a citizen and continuously demanded that the American President grant Pollard a full pardon? What country in the whole world has the second most powerful lobby according to a relatively recent Fortune magazine survey of Washington insiders? Which country in the Middle East is in defiance of 69 United Nations Security Council resolutions and has been protected from 29 more by U.S. vetoes? The answer to all of the above questions is Israel. But what country did the United States almost bomb but for United Nations intervention because "U.N. Security Council resolutions must be obeyed?" Iraq. (See "A pop quiz on the Middle East--answers may surprise you", by Charley Reese, Orlando Sentinel, February 8, 1998, p. 8).

The U.S. policy is so tainted and corrupted by its irrational defense of Israel’s transgressions; and it has gotten so blatant that at an AIPAC conference in Washington, Israel’s outgoing ambassador, Eliahu Ben-Elissar, fondly emoted in a speech that when he walks the halls of Congress he feels at home, as if he "were in the Knesset". (See Newsletter 98, by Council for the National Interest, Washington, DC, Vol. VII, Spring 1998, No. 2, p. 2).

International prosecution of terrorism. The United States and its allies won World War II, and the "victors" decided to prosecute the vanquished for "war crimes". The Nuremberg war crimes trials set a precedence for other international criminal tribunals to prosecute war crimes, genocide and other "crimes against humanity". Those accused as war criminals at the Nuremberg trials were convicted of such crimes as murder and extermination since the crime of "genocide" had not yet been defined by international agreement. "Terrorism" also had not yet been defined.

The U.N. criminal tribunal for Rwanda recently rendered the first international conviction for genocide by finding a former Rwandan mayor guilty of orchestrating systematic murders during the 1994 massacres of Rwandan Tutsis by the rival Hutu tribe. Another U.N. court based at the Hague is still dealing with crimes stemming from the civil conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Thus far, that court has not dealt with the concept of genocide. The Rwandan judgement was the first rendered by an international court for the crimes of sexual violence in a civil war and genocide.

Many scholars, judges, diplomats, and national leaders have advocated a permanent international court with international criminal jurisdiction. (See generally, New Legal Foundations for Global Survival: Security Through the Security Council, by Benjamin Ferencz, Oceana Publications, 1994). Legal experts from around the world have been trying to establish an international criminal court which will, among other things, fill the longstanding legal gap by taking on cases of genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity.

One of the major problems in establishing such a court is the U.S. concern that it could be used against U.S. personnel. American officials say that the U.S., with about 200,000 military personnel permanently stationed in 40 countries around the world, has more at stake than other nations do if a permanent international criminal court is established. (See "U.S. Embroiled in Debate Over War Crimes Court", Arizona Republic, April 5, 1998, p. A6). The U.S. wants strict limits on the court’s authority obviously to limit U.S. exposure to criminal prosecution, but it has come under increasing criticism especially from human rights and legal groups which are the court’s foremost advocates. (Id., p. A6).

On July 17, 1998, The committee of the Whole at the United Nations voted to adopt the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Cheers of exultation and rejoicing filled the room while the United States delegation sat silent and stunned. Earlier, 113 governments voted to take no action on two amendments proposed by the United States. The United States called for a formal, electronically recorded vote on the Statute. The vote was 120 in favor, 7 against, and 21 abstentions. Opposing the Statute to create the Court were China, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Yemen, the United States, and, of course, Israel. (See The InterDependent, "Tyrants Beware: The International Criminal Court is born", by John L. Washburn, United Nations Association of the United Stares of America, Vol. 24, No.2 Summer 1998, p. 5).

The U.S. wanted a guarantee that no American, especially an American military person, would ever be tried by the Court. For a Court to be universal in a world of sovereign states, an exception for any country would be an exception for all countries. Practically, this would have meant that very few, if any, cases would reach the Court other than by referral from the U.N. Security Council. (Id., p. 5). Critics of the U.S. believe that the U.S. wants a court that it, the U.S., can control. " There’s a growing feeling within the African delegates and among other states as well that the United States is willing to have a court, but not one for Americans, one only for others, such as Africans," said Aref Mohammed Aref, a representative of Amnesty International from Djibouti. (See "U.S. Embroiled in Debate Over War Crimes Court", Arizona Republic, April 5,1998, p. A6). The Court does have some flaws--when a case is referred by the Court’s prosecutor (rather than being referred by the Security Council), the ICC (International Criminal Court) may pursue it only if the country of the nationality of the accused, or where the crime occurred, is already a party to the Statute or gives its specific consent. A state becoming a party to the Statute may choose a seven-year exemption from the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes. When the Court or prosecutor intend to avoid domestic jurisdiction, the procedures the nations can use are excessively long and complicated and can degrade evidence and discourage witnesses. The strength of the ICC is its focus on the accountability of individuals for their personal responsibility for crimes. (See The InterDependent, p. 5).

The next steps involve the General Assembly authorizing the Secretary-General to convene a Preparatory Commission of all U.N. member states, probably in early 1999. The Commission will end when 60 ratifications of the Statute bring it into force and require the Secretary-General to inaugurate the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). Countries then not parties to the ASP (probably the United States) will be able to attend the ASP only as observers. The Preparatory Commission will draft a budget and administrative provisions for the ASP to consider. Its primary work will be to negotiate Rules of Procedure and Evidence and definitions of elements of war crimes. (Id., p.7). Nobody has talked about defining "terrorism", but it is possible that some acts which are presently called terrorism may fall under the new definitions of war crimes. Perhaps the ICC will devise a definition of terrorism similar to and as broad as 18 U.S.C. §2331 and tailor it for international application.

If the U.S. or Israel engages in war crimes or terrorism in the future, and the international criminal court acts fairly and impartially since it is not controlled by the United States, Great Britain, or Israel, the U.S. Congress and media will not be able to protect the perpetrators from international justice.

A "law of war" has evolved governing principles of conduct in combat and treatment of civilians and enemy prisoners of war. International treaties such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Protocols to the Geneva Conventions have codified much of this "law of war". (See Department of Army Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare, December 1956; Department of Army Pamphlet 27-1-1, Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, September 1979). Some basic rules of the "law of war" include not attacking noncombatants, not causing destruction beyond the requirement of the mission, not attacking protected property, treating all captives and detainees humanely, not using coercion in the questioning of captives or detainees, and not burning or stealing civilian property. I believe an international criminal court could find that the U.S. and Israel have committed many of these war crimes against the Palestinians and other Arabs under the pretext of combating terrorism.

Executive Order 12,333 states that "[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in assassination." [See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 2.11, 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app 3401 at 44, 50 (1982)]. Some U.S. Congressmen think that Executive Order means that the U.S. can’t send a sniper to kill Saddam Hussein or Gadafi or Osama bin Laden, but that it can send cruise missiles to try to kill them and to inflict collateral damage on innocent civilians and property. The United States and Israel cannot afford to have a truly independent international criminal court to try war crimes or terrorism or genocide or crimes against humanity because they might find themselves being prosecuted as international criminals, themselves.

Lack of dialogue is the problem. How does one criticize Israel’s transgressions without appearing to be anti-Semitic? How does one say he does not like people who happen to be Jewish and engage in terrorists acts , but he is not anti-Semitic? If some Jews support terrorism, and they have, does their condemnation equate to anti-Semitism? I don’t think so. But many people are afraid to speak out as I have in this essay for fear of being called "anti-Semitic". There are no town hall meetings discussing how America supported the terrorism of Israel over the years, how Israel has spied on the U.S. and killed U.S. personnel, how Israel tortured and murdered Palestinian captives, how Israeli "settlements" are a ruse for theft of Palestinian property, and how Israel dominates our foreign policy especially as it relates to the Middle East by the "bribery" and coercion of the U.S. Congress. Why is there no dialogue about the aforesaid issues? Why are people afraid to speak out? What ever happened to freedom of speech in this country? Are there that many people so afraid to speak out for fear of being called anti-Semitic or are they afraid of something else? Does the power of a strongly Jewish influenced national media and the entertainment industry so overwhelm individuals who might speak out that they dare not? We know that outspoken former Congressmen who criticized Israel paid the price because that is why they are "former Congressmen". Are there no people of good faith who would sit at a conference table and discuss many of the issues I’ve presented in this essay, and if not, why not? Nobody can stop terrorism unless they deal with the root causes of terrorism.

Summary and conclusions. The definition of "terrorism" is important because it, like "beauty", is in the eyes of the beholder. Terrorism can be done by individuals or by nation-states and has been done by both. Because of America’s military might, the U.S. has asserted its criminal law jurisdiction internationally and intends to continue to prosecute terrorists for acts which occur even outside the boundaries of the United States.

Terrorists may have many causes and goals--both immediate and long range. They may want to merely harass and intimidate or they may want to create a new nation such as Israel. The primary reason for the use of violence or the threat of violence is to attain political, religious, or ideological goals by instilling fear or using intimidation or coercion.

Middle Eastern terrorists are attacking U.S. citizens because there is a polarization between the cultures of the U.S. and some groups of Arabs and Muslims. Historically, there has been conflict between the parties, but the conflict has become exacerbated by the formation of Israel as it was done and the alliance of the United States with all Israeli actions. The terrorism and excesses of the Israeli Jews against the Arabs bred terrorism by the Arabs against the Jews, and that terrorism has spilled over to the U.S. because of its one-sided and unconditional support of Israel.

Israel was founded out of terrorism. There were secret deals made by Zionists and agents of Great Britain and the U.S. to give a Jewish homeland to the Jews migrating into Palestine. The problem was that the Jews stole the land by force from the Palestinians, and the Arabs have never forgotten that fact. Israel has been directed by the United Nations to leave certain occupied lands in Palestine and Syria per U.N. resolutions, but Israel has never complied. Israel has violated innumerable U.N. resolutions, but the United States has continued to give unwavering support to Israel. The rest of the world knows that Israel has been a rogue state, but the other nations are powerless to do anything about it as long as Israel has the U.S. under its spell.

Zionism--the Jewish movement to create Israel through terrorism--spread like a cancer to corrupt the United States. It has corrupted the U.S. Congress so powerfully that no Congressman dares to ever question the actions of Israel no matter how outrageous they may be. The U.S. gives billions of dollars to Israel each year. The U.S. always votes to support Israel in the United Nations even though the rest of the world may have condemned Israel’s actions. The entertainment industry frequently furthers a negative stereotype of Arabs in the movies and on television. The national news media and radio talk shows almost never explore the transgressions of Israel unless a breaking news story requires a perfunctory coverage--all this to protect Israel. AIPAC has bought the U.S. Congress.

America likes to think it is a nation of laws, and it would like to see international terrorists brought to justice, especially under America’s laws. The world, on the other hand, would like to see an international criminal court which can operate independently and not be influenced by any particular country. The problem with a totally independent international criminal court, from a U.S. perspective, is that the U.S. and perhaps its "ally", Israel, could be the subjects of criminal prosecution. Sending cruise missiles into foreign countries to kill innocent civilians, to destroy private property, or to "assassinate" suspected terrorists on less information or "intelligence" than a local policeman must legally have to make an arrest in this country is questionable at best and probably criminal under international law at worst. The whole world is watching what the U.S. is doing, and they are not as sold on Israel as the U.S. is.

I believe the U.S. is in a dilemma and doesn’t know how to deal with it. There are too many Jews in American society who have contributed to and who still contribute to the arts, business, law, government, entertainment, medicine, education, etc., and they never supported terrorism and still do not support terrorism. These are good and decent people. As for those Jews and others who have supported terrorism and who may still support terrorism, I have no use for those people any more than I do for any Arab, Irishman, Iranian, Muslim, or American terrorist. The U.S. government must never become engaged in state sponsored terrorism because such conduct only invites more terrorism on U.S. citizens and because the international community may some day hold the U.S. and its accomplice, Israel, accountable before some future international tribunal. Terrorism is a crime. We, as U.S. citizens, need to start having some meaningful dialogue and not be duped by the same old bull feces spouted by some Congressmen or law enforcement officials who merely talk about more cops, more money, more toys to fight terrorism; and they never talk about the things I’ve talked about in this essay. Until there is this public dialogue in the U.S. Congress, in the media, and throughout the education system, Americans will continual to be at risk. This essay has presented facts and reasonable inferences based on the facts. Americans need to wake up and demand more from their elected officials on the issues presented in this essay, and they need to circumvent the traditional media to get the facts out to save this once great country. Nobody can stop terrorism unless they deal with the root causes of terrorism. It is in the best interests of America that Americans deal with this problem keeping America’s well-being foremost in mind.

UP

This is a paper I wrote for the Air War College in October, 1991.
I believe it still has relevance today.
Joe Abodeely
December,1998

AIR WAR COLLEGE ASSOCIATE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY
LAW OF WAR CONSIDERATIONS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT OF IRAQ
IN OPERATION DESERT STORM

by
Joseph E. Abodeely
Colonel, USAR
Phoenix, Arizona

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE VOLUME I OPTION THREE

October 1991

CERTIFICATE

I have read and understand the Academic Integrity Section of
the Program Guide, I certify that the creative process of
researching, organizing, and writing this research report
represents only my own work.

Joseph E. Abodeely

DISCLAIMER

This research report represents the views of the author and
does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air
War College of the Department of the Air Force. In accordance
with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is
the property of the United States government and is not to be
reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the
Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Air War College Research Report Abstract
Title:
Law of War Considerations of Aerial Bombardment of
Iraq in Operation Desert Storm

Author:
Joseph E. Abodeely, Colonel, USAR

Analysis and remarks on how Desert Storm occurred and how political and legal considerations were used to justify U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Some of the principles relating to the law of war are discussed in the context of United States' and coalition forces' aerial bombardments of Iraqi forces. The aerial campaign is considered to have probably violated the law of war. Rhetorical questions in the author's conclusions suggest more preferable alternative courses of actions which the United States could have taken.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

COLONEL JOE ABODEELY, U.S. Army Reserves, is currently assigned as Chief, Law Branch of U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA). His legal duties impact on Department of Army policy, including clarifying USAMPOA responsibilities relating to war crimes.

Previous assignments include Staff Judge Advocate (IMA), 11th ADA Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas; Judge Advocate, Military Police Company Commander, Arizona Army National Guard.

During the Tet Offensive, 1968, Vietnam, then 1st Lieutenant Abodeely served with 2/7 Bn, 1st Air Cavalry Division. As reported in the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, April 8, 1968 -- "... Abodeely, 24, of Tucson, Ariz. and his platoon formed the 1st Air Cavalry spearhead of the 20,000 man Operation Pegasus drive that broke the Communist grip around Khe Sanh in a week long drive that covered 12 miles of jungle, hills, and minefields..."

Decorations include combat infantryman's badge, bronze star, air medal, Vietnam service medal with gold star, Vietnamese cross of gallantry with palm (unit citation), and others.

Colonel Abodeely received his R.O.T.C. commission, B.A. degree (English), and Juris Doctor from the University of Arizona.

He served 14 1/2 years as a Maricopa Deputy County Attorney (Prosecutor) where he prosecuted major felony cases, supervised and trained numerous attorneys, provided training to various law enforcement agencies (state and federal) and served as legal advisor on special "sting" and counter-narcotics projects with state and federal agencies.

Colonel Abodeely is presently an attorney (sole practitioner) in private practice which emphasizes criminal defense, administrative law, and military law.

He was a radio talk show host for five years and now hosts a talk-show on public access television.

He lives in Phoenix with his wife, Donna, two German Shepherds, and fourteen cats.

INTRODUCTION

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States, in conjunction with a coalition of armed forces from other countries, ultimately engaged in armed conflict with the military forces of Iraq to protect Saudi Arabia and to liberate occupied Kuwait.

The world public was informed of the diplomatic as well as the military aspects of the war and how the United Nations and the Congress and President of the United States sought to legitimize the conduct of the war through legal actions such as adoption of resolutions to justify military action.

One area of legal consideration relating to the war which had almost no media attention was the aerial bombardment of Iraq and the application of the "law of war" to that bombardment.

Because the rest of the world saw America's conduct of the war, and because other nations are concerned about humanitarian principles relating to the conduct of war, and because Americans have a basic respect for law and humanitarian principles -- it is necessary and wise to consider the potential and actual limitations on the use of air power.

THE THREAT

IRAQ WAS A PARTNER

In a witness statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 6, 1990, a person very knowledgeable of matters relating to the Middle East spoke about what he thought the United States should do regarding Iraq. To put the statement in context, one must remember that Iraq and Iran had been at war for several years; and the United States had supported Iraq. (7:115-118)

The senate witness said:

"The cease-fire with Iran has allowed Iraq to resume its bid for leadership and influence within the Arab world. Iraq ended the war with one of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world...

Even though it enjoys a significant post-war military advantage over Iran, Iraq continues to import arms. Of greater concern, however, is its domestic arms industry, the most advanced in the region...

Although generally mistrustful of the U.S., Iraq would welcome measured U.S. participation in its economic development. Currently, oil exports make it America's second largest Middle Eastern trading partner. The U.S. should continue to develop its contacts with Iraq by building selectively on existing political and economical relationships..." (20:86)

The significance of this testimony is: (1) that it considered Iraq as a "partner" and not a "threat" to the United States;
                                                      (2) that a year later the United States was at war with Iraq; and
                                                      (3) that the testimony was given by General

H. Norman Schwartzkopf, the field commander of the forces to defeat Iraq.  The most critical task in planning the defense of a nation is judging the nature and extent of the threats which may occur, given the structure and objectives of United States national security planning. (15:243)  If Iraq were not truly a "threat" to United States interests, then the destruction wreaked upon Iraq's military and civilian populace is even more egregious irrespective of substantial compliance with "the law of war."

IRAQ BECOMES THE ENEMY

Why, then, did we go to war with Iraq? Arm-chair philosophers, military strategists, and cynics may pose the following reasons for Operation Desert Storm: (1) to protect the oil in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for the United States; (2) to protect the oil in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for America's allies in Europe and Japan; (3) to liberate the Kuwaiti people from Saddam Hussein and return them to the Emir of Kuwait; (4) to rid the world of Saddam Hussein; (5) to bring peace and stability to the Middle East; (6) to justify not cutting defense spending when the "Iron Curtain" (Berlin Wall) came down and U.S. military forces were being cut; (7) to justify using U.S. military forces rather than redeploying them to the United States to be discharged into a sagging economy; (8) to take American citizens' minds off of the sagging economy; (9) to divert American citizens' attention from the Savings and Loan debacle which involved highly prominent businesses, United States Senators, and even the President's son; (10) to help improve the President's ratings in the polls; and (11) to protect Israel. (21)

WORLD PUBLIC OPINION

The "why" of Desert Storm influences other nations' views of the "how" we conducted Desert Storm. If a large segment of the world's nations view United States military action in Desert Storm to have been unnecessary (e.g., Iraq was not a threat to U.S. interests), then they will probably view our military operations (e.g., aerial bombardments) to be in violation of the law of war and other accepted principles of international law relating to armed conflict.

U.S. POLICY FORMULATION

To help understand the "why" Iraq was a "threat" to the United States, it is important to note that at a press breakfast in Washington, D.C. on July 19, 1990, before intelligence information about the Iraqi troop buildup had leaked, Secretary of Defense Cheney was asked about Iraq's "threats" to Kuwait regarding an oil dispute. Cheney replied that the United States would take seriously any threat to U.S. interests or U.S. friends in the region. (27:210)

Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. policy had been unclear toward Iraq. President Bush's administration officials had talked tough about Saddam's threats against Israel, the movement of Iraqi SCUD missile launchers closer to Israel, and Iraq's efforts to illegally import components for nuclear weapons. Yet, at the same time, the administration had thwarted congressional efforts to impose economic sanctions on Iraq or cut U.S. food assistance. (27:211)

President Bush was deeply concerned about Saddam's ability to control the oil in the Middle East. Bush, the former Texas oil man, engaged in extended analysis with his close personal advisors regarding the impact on world oil availability and price. Bush was concerned with if the U.S. and other nations could embargo Iraqi oil and if Saddam would withhold Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil or try to flood the world market and the ultimate impact on U.S. oil resources. (27:226)

There may have been many reasons why Iraq became a threat which justified devastating military action against it, or there may have been no substantially valid reason to have justified Desert Storm. History will ultimately disclose why we went to war with Iraq.

LEGALIZING THE WAR

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

President Bush did an outstanding job of unifying nations to be the coalition of forces to defeat Iraq. He was able to influence the United Nations Security Council to give an air of legitimacy to the ultimate decimation of Iraq.

The Council passed resolutions relating to condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding immediate withdrawal, and ordering a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait.

The Council also voted to give the United States and other naval powers the right to enforce the economic embargo and to allow limited humanitarian food aid into Iraq or Kuwait.

Most importantly, as far as internationally legitimatizing U.S. warfare in the Persian Gulf area, the Council authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991. (24:A12) (See Appendix).

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION

Once the President got the approval of the United Nations Security Council to use military force against Iraq, there was only one other legal obstacle to hurdle before the United States went to war -- Congressional acquiescence.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis had failed -- Bush demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and compliance with all of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions. (26:36-37) Saddam Hussein tried to "link" his withdrawal of forces from Kuwait to a commitment to a Middle East peace conference to settle the festering and long-time Palestinian issue. (5:24) The U.S. should have negotiated with Saddam, but as will be discussed later, the U.S. Israeli lobby in Congress had its own agenda.

There were still questions about the President's policy in the gulf crisis -- why there? Why now? Why the United States? These questions were in Congress's emotional debate that ultimately gave Bush a de facto declaration of war. By 67 votes in the House and only 5 votes in the Senate, Congress granted the President authority to use military force in the Persian Gulf even though there were forceful arguments from Congressmen that the U.N. embargo against Iraq should be allowed more time to work. (17:16-17)

Congress supported the President after being forced to recognize that a defeat for Bush within days of the U.N. deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait would have catastrophic consequences not only for the U.S. policy in the gulf, but for the international coalition against Iraq, too. (17:17) President Bush now had all the "legal" authority he needed to wage war against Iraq. Americans like to believe they do things lawfully.

THE LAW OF WAR

THE CONVENTIONS

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims and the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land were intended to be, and are, legally binding on the United States and its citizens, especially members of the armed forces. (6:1) The policy of the Department of Defense is to ensure: (1) that the law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by the U.S. armed forces; (2) that a program designed to prevent violations of the law of war is implemented by U.S. armed forces; and (3) that alleged violations of the law of war whether committed by or against U.S. or enemy personnel are promptly reported, thoroughly investigated, and corrective action is taken if appropriate. (10:1)

The law of war is derived from two principle sources -- Lawmaking Treaties (or Conventions) such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions and custom which is a body of unwritten or customary law firmly established by the custom of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law. (12:4)

AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS

For purposes of this analysis, the provisions of the Conventions relating to bombardments will be considered.

"The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." (12:19)

Of course, defended places such as forts, defended cities with military forces present or passing through, munitions factories, military supply camps, warehouses, transportation facilities, or other places devoted to support the military operations may be attacked or bombarded whether defended or not. (12:19)

The Conventions prohibit unnecessary killing and devastation:

"... loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained. Once a fort or defended locality has surrendered, only such further damage is permitted as is demanded by the exigencies of war, such as the removal of fortifications, demolition of military buildings, and destruction of stores." (12:20)

Specifically dealing with delivery of munitions from aerial platforms, the Hague Convention of 1907 said:

"There is no prohibition of general application against bombardment from the air of combatant troops, defended places, or other legitimate military objectives." (12:20)

INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS PROHIBITED

Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts prohibits indiscriminate attacks on the enemy civilian populace.

"Indiscriminate attacks are:

(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or

(c) those which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;

and consequently, in each case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objective without distinction." (9:36)

The Protocol further states what may have the most direct application to consider of the United States' aerial bombardment of Iraq:

"Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:

(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and

(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." (9:36)

Did the United States violate the spirit and intent of the law of war relating to the bombing of Iraq? To answer this question, one must consider the air campaign over Iraq and its effects. This writer believes that the massive bombing campaigns on Iraqi civilian populated areas with "dumb" munitions probably violated the aforementioned considerations relating to the law of war.

AIR CAMPAIGN

GENERAL DUGAN WAS PROPHETIC

In September 1990, then Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael J. Dugan said that a massive bombing campaign against Baghdad that specifically targeted Saddam Hussein would be the only way to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. He said "the cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad," and other targets would include Iraqi power systems, roads, railroads, and perhaps domestic petroleum-production facilities except oil fields. He also said that Saddam Hussein, himself, should be specifically targeted. (4:A14)

General Dugan went so far as to say that he asked his planners to interview academics, journalists, ex military, and Iraqi defectors to determine what was unique about Iraqi culture that they put very high value on. (4:A14)

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney explained, after relieving General Dugan of his position, that "we never talk about targeting of specific individuals who are officials of other governments." He said that such action might be a violation of the standing presidential executive order prohibiting U.S. involvement in assassinations of foreign leaders. (23:A8)

BOMBING SADDAM AND LEADERSHIP TARGETS

Eventually Operation Desert Storm commanders ordered a massive search for an American-made motor home believed used by Hussein during a 42-day campaign to hunt down and kill him. In the opening hours of the war in mid-January, Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117 stealth bombers destroyed command bunkers Saddam was using in Baghdad. After the bunkers were destroyed, Air Force planes were divided into teams and patrolled areas likely to be travelled by Saddam's mobile command center. (25:A24)

Saddam survived, but were U.S. forces violating the executive order prohibiting assassination of foreign leaders; or was it just war as usual?

An embarrassment to the U.S. Bombing effort was the destruction on the Amiriya shelter in Baghdad at the cost of several hundred civilian lives. "Leadership targets" were high priority for bombing to get the Iraqi military high command and Baath leadership to overthrow Saddam. (8:20)

The effort to get the "leadership" failed, and the allies were unprepared for the presence of so many innocent family members. One visibly shaken Pentagon source was asked if the victims were in fact dependents of Iraq's ruling elite, and he said, "I don't know. (Burned) women and children all look much the same, don't they?" (8:20)

EFFECTS OF BOMBARDMENTS

What were the overall effects of the U.S. air raids in the Persian Gulf War? Greenpeace, the environmental protection organization conducted interviews with international relief workers, reporters, U.S. officials, and news reports. Greenpeace's report said that over 150,000 people died as a result of the war with Iraq and at least 5 million lost their homes or jobs. (14:A10)

The majority of the bombing casualties were caused by "dumb" bombs and by the 12 million to 16 million bomblets released by an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 cluster bombs dropped by allied planes. (14:A10)

As much as the U.S. media (which was fed its information by the military) portrayed the "smart bombs" striking targets, the truth is that the majority of the munitions hurled on Iraq and Kuwait were "dumb" bombs. Allied jets dropped 88,500 tons of bombs on Iraq and Kuwait, but about 70 percent of them missed their targets. The precision-guided bombs, the icon of Pentagon briefings and the military's preferred image of the war, made up barely 7 percent of the U.S. tonnage dropped on Iraqi targets, said General Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff. (11:A2)

A senior Pentagon official said 81,980 tons of "dumb" or unguided bombs had an accuracy of only about 25 percent. (11:A2) It is reasonable to conclude that there was a great deal of collateral damage -- not destruction of military targets -- caused by the extensive aerial bombardments of populated cities like Baghdad.

The extent of actual unnecessary death and destruction inflicted upon Iraqi non-military targets may never be known, but suffice to say that it is impossible to have conducted the awesome aerial bombardment of Baghdad and other populated areas of Iraq and not have inflicted massive civilian casualties.

AIR FORCE POLICY

The Department of the Air Force policy is that Air Force personnel will comply with the law of armed conflict (law of war) in the conduct of military operations. (3:1)

"The mass annihilation of enemy people is neither humane, permissible, nor militarily necessary. The Hague Regulations prohibit the destruction or seizure of enemy property 'unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.' Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law, and there must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of enemy forces." (1:5-9)

Air Force policy says that collateral damage should not be excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated from the attack, and in all operations every feasible precaution should be taken to keep civilian casualties and damage to a minimum. (2:3-3)

U.S. BOMBING PROBABLY WENT TOO FAR

There have been charges that America and its allies went too far in its bombing of Iraq.

"The Washington Post... said, 'Some targets, especially late in the war, were bombed primarily to create post war leverage over Iraq, not influence the course of the conflict itself.'" (13-A16)

If one couples what the United States failed to achieve in Operation Desert Storm (e.g., to save the oil, to save the Kuwaiti people, to get rid of Saddam, and to bring peace to the Middle East) with the less than clear justification to meet "the threat" and the aerial onslaught inflicted on Iraq -- a war crimes tribunal composed of objective judges (not members of the allied coalition) might be hard - pressed to justify U.S. aerial bombardment under principles of international law.

It is probable that the war with Iraq could have been avoided if the U.S. would have considered a Middle East peace conference to discuss the Palestinian issue, but somebody needed the war. If the war was not necessary, then the bombing of the innocent civilians in the populated areas of Iraq was unnecessary; and the aerial bombardments were violations of the law of war.

CONCLUSIONS

WAR MUST BE A LAST RESORT

Before the United States goes to war, the country must be certain that the enemy is truly a "threat" to justify the awesome lethal force America can dispense to its enemies.

The American people must not allow foreign powers to use special interest groups (like American-Israel Public Affairs Committee -- AIPAC) to pressure Congress to put the American military at war. (19:A14) Israel used the U.S. to neutralize a major Arab threat in Operation Desert Storm.

UNITED STATES PROBABLY VIOLATED LAW OF WAR

Once the decision to go to war is made (and assuming it's a morally, politically, legally, and militarily justifiable decision), the United States must conduct its military operations (including aerial bombardment) in compliance with the law of war. There was much "legal talk" and "legal maneuvering" to get the United States into the war with Iraq, but there was minimal adherence to the law of war by preventing unnecessary killing and devastation.

There is no way that the United States and the allied coalition could have conducted the number of sorties they conducted on the populated areas in Iraq with the over 90 percent "dumb" munitions they used -- and not have inflicted extensive unnecessary killing and devastation. The logic is inescapable. It is highly probable that the mass aerial bombing of highly populated areas in Iraq was "indiscriminate" bombing per se; however, the public will never know because the media was restricted in its reporting of the war casualties and bomb damage assessment.

No one can criticize the outstanding execution of the battlefield operations by the American military forces, but they probably violated the law of war. Would a truly objective war crimes tribunal considering the United States aerial bombardment campaign say it complied, in all instances, with the law of war? Probably not and the U.S. government, military, and people should be concerned if America is going to go to the U.N. to get approval on future military operations.

Nations have wrestled over the decades to try to establish workable rules to govern aerial bombardments, and their efforts have been controversial and not often easy. (18:1-225) Since many of the world's nations are concerned about how aerial bombardment is conducted by belligerents, the United States needs to be concerned not only in "word" but in "deed".

WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD HAVE DONE

Should the United States have avoided armed conflict with Iraq and accepted Iraq's proposal to "link" the Palestinian homeland issue with Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait to prevent the onslaught of Iraq? Should the United States have given the coalition embargo of supplies to Iraq more time to work? Should the United States have tried to effectuate a broad peace plan in the Middle East as it is trying to do now? Should the United States have reevaluated its relationship with Israel (who had demanded a $10 billion loan guarantee and who is continuing to settle Jews in the occupied areas contrary to U.S. and U.N. wishes) a long time ago and taken a firm stance against Israel then? (16:38-39)

The answer to these questions is a resounding YES if Americans truly believe in fair play and justice and the rule of law. Students and practitioners of the art of strategy and warfare must also consider these questions and issues because it is only when "the warrior" has intellectual discipline and integrity that he will be able to live up to what Sun Tzu said:

"... Thus, those who win one hundred triumphs in one hundred conflicts

Do not have supreme skill.

Those who have supreme skill,

Use strategy to bend others without coming to conflict..." (22:45)

The fact that the U.S. conducted the aerial bombardment of Iraq as it did shows that Americans (the people, the political leaders, and the military) still have much to learn about the morality, legality, and the art of war.

APPENDIX: UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

August 3, 1990 -- Resolution 660 -- The Council voted 14-0 to condemn the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Yemen, the only Arab member of the Council did not vote.

August 6, 1990 -- Resolution 661 -- The Council voted 13-0 to order a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Cuba and Yemen abstained.

August 9, 1990 -- Resolution 662 -- The Council voted 15-0 to declare Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void under international law.

August 18, 1990 -- Resolution 664 -- The Council voted 15-0 to demand that Iraq free all detained foreigners.

August 25, 1990 -- Resolution 665 -- The Council voted 13-0 to give the United States and other naval powers the right to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq and Kuwait by halting shipping to those countries. Cuba and Yemen abstained.

September 13, 1990 -- Resolution 666 -- The Council voted 13-2 to allow humanitarian food aid into Iraq or Kuwait only "to relieve human suffering", and said only the Council could decide when those circumstances existed. Cuba and Yemen voted against the measure.

September 15, 1990 -- Resolution 667 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's aggressive acts against diplomatic missions in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreigners from the buildings.

September 24, 1990 -- Resolution 669 -- The Council voted 15-0 to stress that only its Sanctions Committee had the power to permit food, medicine or other humanitarian aid to be sent into Iraq or occupied Kuwait.

September 25, 1990 -- Resolution 670 -- The Council voted 14-1 to explicitly expand its economic embargo to include all air cargo traffic in or out of Iraq and Kuwait except for cargoes of humanitarian aid specifically authorized by its Sanctions Committee. It also called on U.N. member nations to detain any Iraqi ships that may be used to break the naval embargo. Cuba opposed the measure.

October 29, 1990 -- Resolution 674 -- The Council voted 13-0 to hold Iraq liable for war damages and economic losses, to ask nations to collect evidence of grave human rights abuses by the occupying forces, to demand that the Western embassies in Kuwait City be restocked with food and water, and to demand all hostages be released. Cuba and Yemen abstained.

November 28, 1990 -- Resolution 677 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's attempt to alter the demographic character of Kuwait and asked Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to take possession of Kuwait's census and citizenship records for safekeeping.

November 29, 1990 -- Resolution 678 -- The Council voted 12-2 to authorize the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait

after January 15, 1991. (24:A12)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. AFP 110-31, International Law -- The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, Department of the Air Force, Washington, GPO, 19 November 1976.

2. AFP 110-34, Commander's Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Department of the Air Force, Washington, GPO, 25 July 1980.

3. AFR 110-32, Training and Reporting to Insure Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict, Department of the Air Force, Washington, GPO, 2 August 1976.

4. "Air War Called Best Option By U.S. Brass", Arizona Republic, September 16, 1990, p. A14.

5. Alter, Jonathan, "Why 'Linkage' Doesn't Connect", Newsweek, January 21, 1991, p. 24.

6. AR 350-216, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, Department of the Army, Washington, GPO, 7 March 1975.

7. Armacost, Michael H., Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Reagan Administration, "U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging", reprint of a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 16 June 1987, Air War College Associate Studies Vol. II, LSN 33, 1st Ed., pp. 115-118.

8. Barry, John, and Douglas Waller, "What Really Happened", Newsweek, February 25, 1991, p. 20.

9. DAP 27-1-1, Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Department of the Army, Washington, GPO, September 1979.

10. Department of Defense, DoD Law of War Program, DoD Directive 5100.77, Washington, GPO, July 10, 1979.

11. "88, 500 Tons of Bombs -- 70% Missed", Arizona Republic, March 16, 1991, p. A2.

12. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Department of the Army, Washington, GPO, July 1956.

13. "Gulf Air-War Leader Denies Reports Allies Overbombed Iraq", Arizona Republic, June 29, 1991, p. A16.

14. "Gulf War Resulted In 150,000 Deaths, Greenpeace Says", Arizona Republic, May 29, 1991, p. A10.

15. Hartmann, Frederick H. and Robert L. Wendzel, "Defense Planning Problems", reprint from Defending America's Security, 1988, pp. 132-149, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., Air War College Associate Studies Vol. I, LSN 6, 1st Ed., pp. 241-250.

16. Lane, Charles, et al., "A Marriage On The Rocks", Newsweek, September 30, 1991, pp. 38-39.

17. Morganthau, Tom, et al., "Bracing for War", Newsweek, January 21, 1991, pp. 16-19.

18. Parks, W. Hays, "Air War and the Law of War", Air Force Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1990, pp. 1-225.

19. "Pro-Israel Lobbyists Quietly Backed Resolution Allowing Bush to Commit U.S. Troops to Combat", Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1991, pp. A14-A15.

20. Schwartzkopf, Gen. H. Norman, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, reprint of a Witness Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 6, 1990, Air War College Associate Studies Vol, II, LSN 33, 1st Ed., pp. 80-103.

21. Students' discussion in Air War College seminar number 058A, 1991.

22. Sun Tzu, The Art of Strategy, translated by R.L. Wing, New York, Doubleday, 1988.

23. Thompson, Mark, "Air Force Chief is Fired", Arizona Republic, September 18, 1990, pp. A1, A8.

24. "The U.N. Resolutions Against Iraq," Washington Times, February 22, 1991, p. A12.

25. "U.S. Led Iraq Hunt For Motor Home Carrying Saddam", Arizona Republic, June 23, 1991, p. A24.

26. Watson, Russell, et al., "Why Diplomacy Failed", Newsweek, March 4, 1991, pp. 36-37.

27. Woodward, Bob, The Commanders, Simon and Schuster, 1991.

UP

AIR WAR COLLEGE ASSOCIATE STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

CENTCOM 2000

by

Joseph E. Abodeely

Colonel, USAR

Phoenix, Arizona

A "THINK PIECE" SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF VOLUME II

February 1992

 

CERTIFICATE 

I have read and understand the Academic Integrity Section of the Program Guide. I certify that the creative process of researching, organizing, and writing this "think piece" represents only my own work.

______________________________

Joseph E. Abodeely 

DISCLAIMER 

This "think piece" represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 058A

PAGE DISCLAIMER............................................ ii

I. INTRODUCTION..................................... 1

II. UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND.................... 2

MISSIONS AND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.............. 2

IRAN, IRAQ, AND SYRIA............................ 3

LEBANON.......................................... 4

ARABIAN PENINSULA................................ 5

ISRAEL........................................... 7

III. FACTORS AFFECTING CENTCOM BY 2000................ 10

PEACE TALKS...................................... 10

U.S. - ISRAEL RELATIONS.......................... 11

OTHER FACTORS.................................... 12

IV. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY....................... 16

POLICY OBJECTIVES................................ 16

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE AND JOINT DOCTRINE.......... 17

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................. 21

APPENDIX A: ALLIED FORCES IN THE GULF THEATER... 24

APPENDIX B: MEDIA REPORTS REGARDING ISRAEL...... 26

APPENDIX C: UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS.......... 31

BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................... 34

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) has an area of responsibility (AOR) which is probably one of the most volatile and potentially dangerous areas of the world.

The AOR includes what is called the Middle East or Southwest Asia, and Operation Desert Storm was recently conducted in the CENTCOM AOR. Other threats and controversies have been associated with the Middle East--a Palestinian homeland, Israeli occupation of Arab territories in violation of United Nations Resolution 242, terrorism, hostage taking, occupation of Lebanon, and constant armed conflicts.

This paper will cover factors affecting changes in the region and the changes, themselves, around the year 2000; threats and changes to national objectives which will influence USCENTCOM's mission; and analysis of deficiencies of current national military strategy, joint doctrine, and U.S. force structure to successfully accomplish the mission to 2000.

Chapter II

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

MISSIONS AND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

USCENTCOM became a unified command on January 1, 1983 after evolving from the Carter Doctrine and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. CENTCOM has three primary U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East: (1) to maintain access to oil (77 percent of the Free World's oil reserves exist there), (2) to protect the free flow of primarily maritime commerce in the region, and (3) to limit Soviet influence. (11:1)

CENTCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) is one and one- half times larger than the United States and has 380 million people in 19 countries. It is so expansive that the western flank extends from Egypt to Kenya on the west side of the Red Sea on the African continent. All of the Arabian Peninsula is in the AOR including Jordan. Four countries--Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan--are a multi-state buffer between the oil fields and what used to be the Soviet Union. The AOR's east-west expanse extends from China's and India's borders to Libya. (11:1)

The 19 countries within CENTCOM's area of responsibility are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, South Yemen, North Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. (Note that Syria, Lebanon, and Israel are in the European Command's AOR. When CENTCOM was formed, these three countries were not put in CENTCOM's AOR due to the animosity between Israel and the Arab states. (10:10-16) Because of their obvious proximity and influence in the region, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel will be considered with the CENTCOM countries in this paper.)

When one considers common sense, intuition, and recent headlines, the Middle East (which is in CENTCOM's AOR) is the world's most dangerous trouble spot. (8:27)

IRAN, IRAQ, AND SYRIA

The Iran-Iraq Gulf War of 1980 to 1988 was a flare-up of an old conflict between the Persians and their western neighbors over control of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the Shatt-al-Arab. The conflict has recurred with regularity since around 500 B.C. (8:96) Iran's problems stem from its "Islamic revolution" (Shiite Muslims).

Iraq, geographically centered, distrusts all of its neighbors; and even as it invaded Kuwait and became the target of an awesome allied forces, the Iraqi Baath regime still conducted war against the Kurds. (8:97)

Iraq was perceived as a threat to its neighbors and to U.S. interests and was ultimately devastated by the coalition of allied forces and their resources. (6:64) (See Appendix A).

Syria confronts Israel to the west and is embroiled in Lebanon. Syria has a real worry about Iraq, its centuries-old rival, which the Syrian Alawite (and Syrian Baath) regime regards as the second most regional enemy after Israel. (8:97)

Water may become an important factor influencing the politics and potential warfare in the region because Syria sits astride the Euphrates River, and Syrian dams back up water that Iraqis believe belongs to them. If access to the Euphrates River water becomes an issue of survival, Syria and Iraq, former Gulf War rivals, could become allies against Turkey, which controls Syrian access to the Euphrates. (8:97)

LEBANON

The current conflict in Lebanon is extremely complex. Lebanon in the 1940s through the 1960s had Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Sunni Muslims, and Shiites living together as in a Middle East Switzerland. Arab princes and businessmen from orthodox Muslim countries cavorted and did business, and the underground trade with Israel flourished; but displaced Palestinians living in refugee camps were not part of the major political and business activities, nor were the Syrians who envisioned Lebanon as an integral part of "Greater Syria". (8:38) The volatile consensus turned into armed fragments.

At the core of the conflict in Lebanon are three major issues: What should be done with the Arab Christians including a substantial minority of the Palestinian Christians? Where should the Palestinians go since the creation of Israel? How will the imperial ambitions of Syria be stopped or accommodated? (8:38)

Without going into detail, and to merely give a "flavor" of who is involved and the local politics of the Lebanese conflict -- here are some of the "players": Syria, Israel, Israeli-Arab Allies, Shiites, Iranian-controlled Shiites, Maronite Christians, Druze, Sunnis, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), PLO factions, Palestinians, Greek Orthodox, Armenians, Melchities, Protestants, United Nations, France, United States, Russia, and Iraq. (8:39-42)

ARABIAN PENINSULA

The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow channel between the tip of Oman and Iran. Oil tankers traverse the Omani side where the water is deepest. The strait narrows to fifty kilometers in width and is extremely vulnerable to antiship missile batteries firing Exocet-type missiles or long range guns sited on nearby islands. Mines have been the weapons of choices--for example, Iran's mining of the Persian Gulf shallows during its war with Iraq. (8:135-196) CENTCOM's mission relates directly to keeping the oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz and will continue through the year 2000.

Historically, the Persian Gulf has been the site of strategic and regional conflict because of the United States, Japan's, and Western Europe's battle with the former Soviet Union over control of the oil-supply lines and because of various petty but deadly intertribal and ethnic squabbles that have existed for centuries. (8:138) The future holds the same potential for war.

Other factors adding fuel to the fire in the region include monarchism, geostrategic change, Islamic values and beliefs in a modern world, and the impact of wealth brought by oil -- these factors effect Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, and others on the Arabian Peninsula. (8:134)

Saudi Arabia relies on the United States as the guarantor of its existence even though the Saudis dislike the West and the presence of non-Islamic foreigners in their nation. It must be remembered that the two holiest cities of the Islamic faith, Medina and Mecca, are in Saudi Arabia. (8:140)

Saudi Arabia is the dominant oil rich country (one of six) in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which was formed in 1981 in response to Iran's threat. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have forty percent of the world's known oil reserves. Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are the other three members of the GCC. The governments in five of the six gulf states are Sunni Muslims. (10:12)

It is interesting to note that there was great concern during the Iran-Iraq war that if Iraq fell, Iran would pursue its Islamic fundamentalist movement throughout the Arabian Peninsula. (10:12) This concern may explain why the United States and the coalition forces did not devastate Iraq more than they did -- to leave a buffer against Iran. This may also account for, in part, why Saddam Hussein was not assassinated by allied forces; but Operation Desert Storm proved the United States resolve to protect the Arabian Peninsula and its valuable oil reserves and the free flow of oil.

ISRAEL

After WWI, Britain's 1917 Balfour Declaration promised the Jews who had settled in the Ottoman-controlled Palestinian region a "Jewish home", but they promised the Arabs their own states, too. The WWI defeat of the Ottomans left the Arabian Peninsula and the Holy Land vulnerable to any politicians desiring to draw new maps. Many Palestinians went to Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria; and riots and armed battles occurred between Arabs and Jews in the 1920s. As time passed, Jewish leaders demanded that they be given a Jewish homeland pursuant to the Balfour Declaration. Although the British and French tried to stall a response to the demand, Hitler's Holocaust made Western opposition to a Zionist state impossible. Irgun terrorism against the British prompted the creation of Israel. (8:67-68)

The Arab League did not agree that the Jews should get their homeland. Palestine, in their view, had been Arab since the prophet's imperialist forces overran the Jordan Valley except for that period when the Latin Crusader states occupied the area for a couple of centuries. Israel appeared to be Jewish Crusaders backed by the West -- the United States, ultimately -- with weapons, money, and strong moral support. The situation was natural for the Arabs to get their support from what was then the Soviet Union. (8:67-68)

Regarding a historic, Biblical, moral, or legal claim to Palestine -- Palestinians are primarily descendants of those Semites who occupied Palestine from time immemorial -- the Canaanites and other Semitic tribes. They are also descendants of Jews who were taken into captivity by the Assyrians or the Babylonians and ultimately absorbed by the remainder of the population. They also include the descendants of those non-Semites who may have remained behind after the Persians, Macedonians, Romans, and other conquerors had been driven out by the Arab invasion and who were completely Arabised by that invasion, including the remnants of the Crusaders. The Ottoman Muslim rule which lasted 400 years and which ended in 1917 did not alter the Arabic or Muslim structure of the people of Palestine. (5:6-7)

The point, arguably, is that contemporary Jews have no compelling religious, historical, moral, or legal claim to Palestine; they occupy the area as a result of sympathy for the Holocaust and by use of armed and often brutal, force, This historical tension between the Arabs and Jews, the Palestinian issue (a homeland), and Israel's refusal to withdraw from the areas it seized in the 1967 war pursuant to United Nations Resolution 242 are factors which can draw United States armed forces into armed conflict in the region especially since the U.S. has taken an often irrational support role toward Israel.

Israel's hard-line militant policies are appealing to Sephardic Jews who have been oppressed under Arab or pro-Arab regimes and who support the Likud, Begin's and Shamir's party. The various factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the "intifada" (Palestinian attempt to throw off their oppression), deep-seated religious differences, terrorism, a rapidly growing Arab population, and a horrendous inflation rate all are factors which suggest that a war involving major regional powers and nuclear arms involving Israel is a very dangerous possibility. (8:60)

Chapter III

FACTORS AFFECTING CENTCOM BY 2000

PEACE TALKS

The fact that Middle East peace talks occurred in Madrid, Spain and in Washington, D.C. shows promise for peace in the region. Even though Israel initially threatened to not attend the meeting in Washington, U.S. leaders forced Yitzak Shamir's hand on the peace talks and did not give him time (when he was in Washington) to explain Israel's ten billion dollars loan needs for financing immigration of Soviet Jews. (17:A8)

While the peace talks were being planned, Israel announced that it would deport a dozen Palestinian activists. That decision temporarily disrupted plans to resume Mideast peace talks in Washington because Palestinian delegates planned to not attend. (24:A1) Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon joined Palestinians in delaying the departure of their negotiators for talks with Israel because of the decision to expel twelve Palestinians from occupied Arab territories. (4:A19)

On the eve of a new round of Middle East peace talks in Washington, the United States joined the United Nations Security Council in strongly condemning Israel's planned deportation of the twelve Palestinians. The fifteen members of the council voted unanimously to condemn the expulsion orders, calling them a violation of international law. They also asked Israel to halt all deportations and to allow deportees to return. The United States which had used its veto to shield its ally, Israel, so many times in the past, joined in council criticism of expulsions of Palestinians several times over the past year. (42:A8)

If the peace process would only proceed in good faith, there is a possibility that peace can be achieved at least as to the Palestinian issue; and Israeli peace negotiators said that they would be ready to bargain with Palestinians over limited self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (19:A11) The problem is that Israel's actions around the time of the peace talks (deportations) and at other times (to be discussed) belie an attitude desirous of peace. Jordan's King Hussein has stated publicly that he believes that Israeli leaders even "fear peace". (22:A23)

U.S. - ISRAELI RELATIONS

Israel is a key to peace in the most dangerous region of the world. The United States and how it handles Israel is even a greater key to peace in the region and the whole world if the U.S. chooses to be ingenious, tough, and fair. Because of the historical and religious ties between the U.S. and Israel (e.g., the Judeo-Christian commonality), because many Jews have been quick to label any criticism of Israel's policies as "anti-Semitic", and because the Israeli lobby (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee -- AIPAC) has such a strong influence on the U.S. government (especially Congress), U.S. policy in the past has been loathe to criticize or not support Israel and the U.S. continues to give weapons, money, and moral support to Israel. AIPAC was instrumental in swinging the votes necessary in Congress to authorize President Bush to go to war against Iraq. (37:A14-15)

It often appears that Israel does not want peace in the region; and despite President Bush's plea for restraint in weapons sales to the Middle East, the U.S. has trasferred approximately six billion dollars in arms to the region as reported by the Arms Control Association, a private research group. (32:A8) Thus, some may say the U.S., Israel's arch ally, does not want peace in the Middle East.

Israel's luster has become tarnished as the American Congress, President, and people have become more aware of how Israel operates and how what goes on in the Middle East does affect Americans at home. Probably the best way to illustrate the point is to study some media reports which are the only "intelligence" information most Americans will receive to learn of some of Israeli intransigence. (Appendix B)

OTHER FACTORS

Other factors which impose threats to CENTCOM's AOR include Iran's role in the region, Saddam Hussein's goals, Syria's goals, etc. The region is a powder keg waiting to explode, and the U.S. can either wait and watch it ignite or it can be a "broker" for peace in the region.

Because of the U.S. policy not to sanction Israel, Israel acts; and other armed factions and countries in the region react. It appears that Iran is going to retaliate against Israel, and this could mean more "terrorism" and possible hostage taking. Israel and Syria are two of the military giants in the region with Israel having 104,000 men under arms, 3,800 tanks, 11,000 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,400 artillery pieces while Syria has 300,000 men, 4,000 tanks, 4,300 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,650 artillery pieces. (45:110-111)

Perhaps one of the scariest factors posing a threat to CENTCOM is that as the old Soviet Union broke up, some of the states in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) still had tactical nuclear weapons. Shorter range tactical weapons could become "loose nukes". The Soviet arsenal contained about 15,000 of them (missiles, bombs, mines, and artillery shells). These weapons are portable and subject to less elaborate controls than are strategic missiles. (44:32)

If tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of C.I.S. states (which are predominantly Muslim) wind up in the hands of their radical Muslim brothers in CENTCOM's AOR -- a holocaust could occur. A tactical nuclear device capable of being detonated in a vehicle, a building, or a vacant lot becomes the ultimate "terror toy".

What used to be Soviet Central Asia (which include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) may become a new geopolitical battleground. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are the chief rivals for influence with the five resource-rich Central Asian republics. They are vying for access to markets, gold, cotton, and natural gas; and they are also racing to win the hearts and minds of more than fifty million Muslims newly released from seventy-four years of totalitarian rule. (36:28) A unified Islamic region from Soviet Central Asia extending through CENTCOM's AOR could pose a threat by 2000.

Turkey, a Muslim country, market-oriented and friendly to the U.S., has a head start on its rivals with its various projects; Iran, a close second, has a tenacious anti-American bent; Saudi Arabia wants to give Islamic services to people deprived of them for seven decades. (36:28-29)

Thus, the U.S. needs to get involved (economic development) to counter this new specter of a resurgent Islam with access to nuclear weapons. Recently an Italian undercover operation seized a small sample of plutonium-229 (part of a larger load), probably of Soviet origin, and probably destined for Iraq or Libya. (35:29) "Loose nukes" pose a threat for the future.

It has been reported that Libya tried to hire two Russian experts for its nuclear program, but the scientists turned down the offer because they were not offered enough money. (31:A11)

Pakistan has recently announced that it has the capacity to make an atomic bomb. (33:B12)

Iran has quietly bought billions of dollars worth of advanced fighter planes and tanks from Russia and other former Soviet republics raising fears that it could replace Iraq as the biggest menace to peace in the Persian Gulf. (14:A2) Iran finances Hezbollah, the Shiite Muslim guerrilla group. It is the parent movement for extremist factions that held most of Western hostages in Lebanon and was responsible for a suicide bombing that killed hundreds of U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983. (13:A2)

Iran has established bases in Sudan to train fundamentalist Muslim rebels, and this has caused consternation for the U.S., Egypt (Sudan's northern neighbor), and Tunisia (worried about terrorism). (12:A11)

Chapter IV

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

POLICY OBJECTIVES

JCS Publication 1-02 defines national military strategy as "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force." Thus, CENTCOM's three objectives -- to protect the oil, to protect maritime commerce, and to limit Soviet influence -- as a part of national military strategy are to be accomplished with military force or threat of its use. The first two objectives (protect the oil and shipping) are even more critical and complex today due to the jockeying for position as "leader of the pack" by some of the "players" -- whether a nation-state or a small, zealous, armed faction.

U.S. strategy and policy in the CENTCOM AOR have had another objective in the region: the protection and support of Israel at all costs. In the past, the U.S. has looked the other way when Israel, like an errant child, misbehaved; and the numerous votes of the U.S. and Israel (against the rest of the nations) in the U.N. often illustrated the point.

It appears that in recent times the U.S. has taken a more objective stance in dealing with Israel as shown by its "brokerage" of the Middle East Peace talks and its condemnation of the deportation of Palestinians. Still, the U.S. must do more for the best interests of the U.S. -- not Israel. If, in order to control Israel, the U.S. must cease giving weapons, money, and moral support, then it must do so. If the U.S. does not have the will to act decisively or cannot act in this regard, as stated previously, the Middle East is a powder keg waiting to explode. The real problem is that the explosives may not be dynamite, but nuclear.

Desert Storm should be the vehicle for the U.S. to take this initiative and continue to aggressively exploit its positive relationships with the Arab states who were part of the coalition against Iraq to bring peace to the region.

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE AND JOINT DOCTRINE

It has been said that the U.S. is the only Western power that can intervene in the Persian Gulf region in a moderate to high level conflict; but it will be critically limited by the availability of bases and facilities in the area; and the size of the U.S. forces committed will be limited by strategic and airlift capabilities. (7:109)

Desert Storm proved that other Western and Arab powers can intervene in the region, but under the aegis of the U.S. The victory of Desert Storm should not lull the U.S. into believing it will be so lucky to have a future foe in the region who will allow the U.S. several months to transport its military personnel and materiel to the locale to do battle. Nor should Americans believe that future wars in the region will be as bloodless as was the war against Iraq. (6:206)

If the U.S. must respond to future contingencies, it will need the same kinds of forces and equipment used in Desert Storm. It will especially need more sealift capability to get more U.S. tanks there to defend the troops from enemy armored attacks and more anti-mine and amphibious operations capabilities. The 82nd Airborne and the Marines got to Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield) quickly but were vulnerable to armored attack. Eight fast sealift ships took nearly a month to transport the 24th Infantry, a mechanized division. (41:20-21) Army divisions will be smaller, but need to be an effective mix of armor, light infantry, and airmobile. "Airborne" should be smaller numbers.

Because of the various strains on the U.S. economy, the military budget will be cut, and personnel and weapons systems will be cut dramatically. The U.S. will have to do more with less, but better, in 2000.

There needs to be new thinking in all of the services in terms of accomplishing missions -- use of hi-tech equipment as shown by Desert Storm, more sealift, intelligent and effective use of air power, less use of strategic missiles and bombers, more use of reserve forces, and more emphasis on "intelligence". Force structure will be reconstituted and "joint operations" will be the rule -- not the exception.

To strengthen intelligence support to combat commanders, the Department of Defense is combining the analysis of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands and their components into Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) under the control of designated Unified and Specified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). This will save resources by cutting duplicative efforts and will strengthen support to the CINCs and components through improved efficiency. (3:6) The Defense Intelligence Agency will also be strengthened. (3:6)

Relating to "intelligence" and possibly other innovative missions is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAVs are less expensive than full sized aircraft, can be mounted with various sensors (radar, cameras, infrared detectors), involves no risk of loss of human life, and can even be armed. (40:119)

Because there will be major personnel reductions in all the services, the reserve components will be more integrated into operational requirements. Individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) can meet future mission requirements at reduced costs as troop program units (TPUs) and their personnel are cut back.

Military attorneys should be more readily available to perform missions for military personnel and to act as operational advisors to commanders. Certain corporate operations integrate legal counsel on a frequent basis; military operations should do the same because of the "CNN factor".

Special operations forces (SOF) will greatly support CENTCOM missions through 2000. SOF were used in Desert Storm with great success.

The bottom line is that force structure and equipment for future CENTCOM missions will have to be "reconstituted", capable of rapid deployment to the AOR, be "high-tech", be armor and mechanized infantry oriented for ground warfare; "intelligence" will be improved; and the doctrine will be "joint operations". Through 2000, air power will be similar to that used against Iraq, but the Air Force command structures will be stream-lined.

Chapter V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The history of the Middle East (CENTCOM's AOR) clearly is a guide for the future -- there has been, is now, and will be armed conflicts in the AOR through 2000. Regional wars, terrorism, hostage taking, and the horrendous possibility of a nuclear detonation are all contingencies for which CENTCOM must be prepared and have a forward presence.

CENTCOM force structure must be capable of rapid deployment and crisis response; the present prepositioning of materiel in the region must be maintained and enhanced; there will be a greater reliance on "hi-tech" weapons and a combination of active and reserve forces because the U.S. ecomomy cannot afford opulent expenditures on national defense; and the U.S. will have to become more internationally politically involved in the Middle East -- the "coalition" concept.

The U.S. relied on the United Nations extensively prior to executing Desert Storm as evidenced by the U.N. resolutions posed prior to going to war (Appendix C); and recently, world leaders who met at the first Security Council summit in history, pressed the United Nations to have a stronger role in dealing with crises, protecting human rights, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and arms control. (38:A13) It should also be remembered that the U.N. chose Butros Ghali of Egypt (an Arab) as the Secretary General. (2:A2)

Thus, the U.S. will have to deal with the Arab mindset and culture in CENTCOM and in the U.N. more than before. Principles of international law will be touted more than before because of an increased role by the United Nations. Military lawyers, knowledgeable in international law, expecially the "law of war", will be invaluable to CENTCOM. They were everywhere during the Gulf War working in headquarters of CENTCOM, sleeping in the sands alongside troops in the field, negotiating host-nation agreements, and advising commanders on the legal implications of targeting decisions and weapons use. (30:52)

"Warriors" knowledgeable in the customs, values, and history of the Middle East will also be invaluable to CENTCOM's mission. More U.S. military personnel should be trained to speak, read, and write Arabic and to learn about the Arabic culture as we learned about the "Soviets". These "warriors" must also be "joint doctrine" oriented -- they need to know and work with their "sister" services.

Whether the U.S. goes to war or promotes peace in CENTCOM, the U.S. will have to establish itself as a "player", not as an antagonist, in the Middle East. The potential consequences are too devastating for the U.S. to ignore a more pro-Arab posture in the region. No country, including Israel, is worth the risk of nuclear holocaust, especially when that "country" may be a significant part of the problem. Rethinking this particular issue will be the U.S.'s most difficult policy challenge.

APPENDIX A

ALLIED FORCES IN THE GULF THEATER (6:64)

AFGHANISTAN ...... 300 Mujahedin troops

ARGENTINA ...... 1 destroyer, 1 corvette, 2 air force transport planes

AUSTRALIA ...... 1 guided-missile destroyer, 1 frigate, 1 supply ship, 2 surgical teams

BAHRAIN ...... 3,000 troops

BANGLADESH ...... 6,000 troops

BELGIUM ...... 1 frigate, 2 minesweepers, 2 landing ships, 1 supply ship, 6 C-130 transport planes

BRITAIN ...... 43,000 troops, 6 destroyers, 4 frigates, 3 minesweepers, 5 support ships, 168

tanks, 300 armored vehicles, 70 Tornado and Jaguar combat jets

CANADA ...... 2 destroyers, 1 supply ship, 12 C-130 transport planes, 24 CF-18 bombers

CZECHOSLOVAKIA ... 200 chemical-warfare specialists

DENMARK ...... 1 corvette

EGYPT ...... 40,000 troops, including 2 armored divisions and 5,000 Special Forces paratroopers

FRANCE ...... 18,000 troops, 60 combat aircraft, 120 helicopters, 40 tanks, 100 armored vehicles,1 missile cruiser, 3 destroyers, 4 frigates

GREECE ...... 1 frigate

HONDURAS ...... 150 troops

HUNGARY ...... 40 medical personnel

ITALY ...... 2 corvettes, 3 frigates, 1 supply ship, 4 minesweepers, 10 Tornado ground attack aircraft

JAPAN ...... medical personnel and supplies

KUWAIT ...... 11,000 troops

MOROCCO ...... 1,700 troops

THE NETHERLANDS... 2 frigates, 1 supply ship

NEW ZEALAND ...... 3 C-130 Hercules transport planes, 1 medical team

NIGER ...... 500 troops

NORWAY ...... 1 Coast Guard cutter, 1 transport ship

OMAN ...... 25,500 troops, 63 airplanes, 4 Exocet- armed ships

PAKISTAN ...... 7,000 troops

THE PHILIPPINES... medical personnel

POLAND ...... 2 rescue ships

PORTUGAL ...... 1 naval logistics ship

QATAR ...... 1 squadron of Mirage F-1E fighter planes

ROMANIA ...... 360 medical personnel, 180 chemical warfare experts

SAUDI ARABIA...... 118,000 troops, 550 tanks, 180 combat planes, 8 frigates

SENEGAL ...... 500 troops

SIERRA LEONE...... 30 medical personnel

SINGAPORE ...... 35-man medical team

SOUTH KOREA ...... 5 C-130 Hercules transport planes, 150-man medical team

SPAIN ...... 1 frigate, 2 corvettes, 1 supply ship, 1 C-130 transport plane

SWEDEN ...... field hospital and medical personnel

SYRIA ...... 17,000 troops, 300 T-62 tanks

UNITED ARAB

EMIRATES ...... 40,000 troops, 80 combat planes, 15 ships, 200 tanks

UNITED STATES ... 540,000 troops, 6 aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, 2,000 tanks, 2,200 armored personnel carriers, 1,700 helicopters, 100 warships, 1,800 airplanes

 APPENDIX B

MEDIA REPORTS REGARDING ISRAEL

In one editorial, the writer pointed out that the recently dedicated Navy memorial would not have a plaque commemorating one of the Navy's most heroic incidents -- the brutal and unprovoked attack by Israeli warplanes and torpedo boats on the U.S.S. Liberty, a highly armed and clearly marked intelligence gathering ship in international waters. (46:C3)

The Palestine Human Rights Information Center reported that Israeli interrogators have used electric-shock torture to extract confessions from prisoners in the occupied territories. (27:A9)

The New York Times reported that Israel sold several billion dollars in American-made weapons to Iran in the early 1980s with the knowledge of the United States under an agreement worked out by the Reagan administration. The U.S. rescinded the agreement in 1982 after it was determined that the Israeli defense minister was selling military materiel without Washington's permission. (34:A9)

Another editorial accused Israel as having something in common with Saddam Hussein's Iraq -- both disregard U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Israel's stated intent to deport twelve Palestinians was criticized. (9:A14)

It has been reported that Israel is opening relations with China, the last world power to embrace communism. (21:A10)

The Israeli army has banned Palestinian pedestrian traffic in the occupied West Bank at night. Although over 100,000 Jews live in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip area, 1.75 million Palestinians live there. The recent rapid expansion of Israeli settlements on the Palestinians' homeland has been condemned internationally as an obstacle to peace. (16:A15)

Yitzak Shamir kicked off his re-election campaign recently with a promise to build more Jewish settlements in the occupied territories while the United States contends that the settlements are an obstacle to peace with the over 1.7 million Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (23:A9)

The Israeli army said it would beef up its forces in the occupied West Bank by twenty percent by adding more regular soldiers and special units allegedly to try to halt attacks on Jewish settlers. This move follows demands by settlers for better protection and tougher treatment for Arab militants. It also comes amid Shamir's political crisis in which his coalition has lost its majority in the Knesset (parliament) because of defections by far-right leaders who are the settler's main supporters. (20:A9)

The Israeli army has "widened" its rules on firing on Arabs. A military source said new regulations would lessen the danger to soldiers implying that the soldiers may be allowed to fire live ammunition directly at a suspect without warning if they believe their lives are in danger. (25:A4)

At least four Jewish settlers have been shot since October 1991 prompting retaliatory raids by the settlers. Radical Palestinian groups were blamed for the shootings. At least 879 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli solders or civilians since the "intifada" began over four years ago. Seventy-seven Israelis have died. (25:A4)

In a recent editorial it was reported that there was high level corruption in Israel's military and industrial establishments which have siphoned off millions of dollars in American aid. Some of the missing money was believed to have been used for Israeli espionage in the United States -- Israel denies this. What is undisputed is that key figures in Israel's procurement program have diverted millions of dollars into their own pockets. (1:A12)

Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's Prime Minister, recently said that Israel is no longer obligated to strictly follow the Camp David accords which outline a plan for Palestinian autonomy in the occupied lands. This was the first time an Israeli leader questioned Israel's commitment to the 1978 U.S. - brokered accords which serve as a basis for U.S. and Israeli diplomacy in the Middle East. (18:B12)

Recently, attackers believed to be Palestinians or Israeli Arabs killed three soldiers at a base in Israel near the occupied West Bank. Only hours later, Israel aircraft attacked Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in retaliation. Fixed winged aircraft and helicopters fired rockets into an alleged PLO headquarters house; two rockets hit the outskirts of a refugee camp killing four Lebanese civilians including two children and a woman, and wounding six persons, and badly damaging three residential buildings. (15:A21)

It was reported that this revenge strike by Israel could seriously damage the Middle East peace process because the rocket-firing helicopters killed the leader of Lebanon's pro-Iran Hezbollah guerilla group. Sheik Abbas Musawi, his wife, and their five-year-old son were burned alive in what Hezbollah called "a cowardly air attack". (29:A1)

Hezbollah (Party of God) was considered to be the umbrella group for Shiite Muslim holders of Western hostages in Lebanon. It opposes the Middle East peace talks, and Shiite Muslim leaders vowed revenge and called for a holy war against Israel. (29:A1)

Without knowing for certain who killed the three Israeli soldiers, Israel has engaged in massive, indiscriminate retaliation killing innocent women and children, killing a Shiite leader (Musawi) who helped to arrange the release of American and British hostages in Lebanon last year.

An Israeli tank force, helicopter gunships, and a bulldozer flattened United Nations barricades, and the Israelis attacked two Lebanese villages to hunt for Shiite Muslim guerrillas who have been rocketing Israel. The U.N. peacekeepers tried to block the Israeli invasion, and fistfights broke out before the Israeli soldiers plowed through and seized two Lebanese villages. The Israeli invasion, just north of its self-declared security zone, drew a sharp protest from U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Ghali who called for an immediate withdrawal. The Bush administration expressed "deep concern". (28:A1)

Twenty-four hours after storming two villages in Lebanon, Israeli forces withdrew. Meanwhile, Israel again failed to win U.S. agreement for ten billion dollars in loan guarantees. (26:A1)

Secretary of State Baker recently demanded that Israel freeze settlements in the occupied territories to get ten billion dollars in U.S. loan guarantees as the Middle East peace talks resumed recently. The demand delighted Arabs but seemed likely to provoke an open crisis with Israel, possibly causing a break after decades during which Washington has acted as unquestioning ally and banker for the Jewish state. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir was defiant, but Baker gave Israel alternatives -- build the settlements and not get the loan guarantees, or not build and get them. (43:A1)

APPENDIX C

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (39:A12)

August 3, 1990 -- Resolution 660 -- The Council voted 14-0 to condemn the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Yemen, the only Arab member of the Council did not vote.

August 6, 1990 -- Resolution 661 -- The Council voted 13-0 to order a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Cuba and Yemen abstained.

August 9, 1990 -- Resolution 662 -- The Council voted 15-0 to declare Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void under international law.

August 18, 1990 -- Resolution 664 -- The Council voted 15-0 to demand that Iraq free all detained foreigners.

August 25, 1990 -- Resolution 665 -- The Council voted 13-0 to give the United States and other naval powers the right to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq and Kuwait by halting shipping to those countries. Cuba and Yemen abstained.

September 13, 1990 -- Resolution 666 -- The Council voted 13-2 to allow humanitarian food aid into Iraq or Kuwait only "to relieve human suffering", and said only the Council could decide when those circumstances existed. Cuba and Yemen voted against the measure.

September 15, 1990 -- Resolution 667 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's aggressive acts against diplomatic missions in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreigners from the buildings.

September 24, 1990 -- Resolution 669 -- The Council voted 15-0 to stress that only its Sanctions Committee had the power to permit food, medicine or other humanitarian aid to be sent into Iraq or occupied Kuwait.

September 25, 1990 -- Resolution 670 -- The Council voted 14-1 to explicitly expand its economic embargo to include all air cargo traffic in or out of Iraq and Kuwait except for cargoes of humanitarian aid specifically authorized by its Sanctions Committee. It also called on U.N. member nations to detain any Iraqi ships that may be used to break the naval embargo. Cuba opposed the measure.

October 29, 1990 -- Resolution 674 -- The Council voted 13-0 to hold Iraq liable for war damages and economic losses, to ask nations to collect evidence of grave human rights abuses by the occupying forces, to demand that the Western embassies in Kuwait City be restocked with food and water, and to demand all hostages be released. Cuba and Yemen abstained.

November 28, 1990 -- Resolution 677 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's attempt to alter the demographic character of Kuwait and asked Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to take possession of Kuwait's census and citizenship records for safekeeping.

November 29, 1990 -- Resolution 678 -- The Council voted 12-2 to authorize the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991.

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