A "THINK PIECE" SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN FULFILLMENT OF VOLUME II
I have read and understand the Academic Integrity Section of the Program Guide. I certify that the creative process of researching, organizing, and writing this "think piece" represents only my own work.
Joseph E. Abodeely
This "think piece" represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) has an area of responsibility (AOR) which is probably one of the most volatile and potentially dangerous areas of the world.
The AOR includes what is called the Middle East or Southwest Asia, and Operation Desert Storm was recently conducted in the CENTCOM AOR. Other threats and controversies have been associated with the Middle East--a Palestinian homeland, Israeli occupation of Arab territories in violation of United Nations Resolution 242, terrorism, hostage taking, occupation of Lebanon, and constant armed conflicts.
This paper will cover factors affecting changes in the region and the changes, themselves, around the year 2000; threats and changes to national objectives which will influence USCENTCOM's mission; and analysis of deficiencies of current national military strategy, joint doctrine, and U.S. force structure to successfully accomplish the mission to 2000.
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
MISSIONS AND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
USCENTCOM became a unified command on January 1, 1983 after evolving from the Carter Doctrine and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. CENTCOM has three primary U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East: (1) to maintain access to oil (77 percent of the Free World's oil reserves exist there), (2) to protect the free flow of primarily maritime commerce in the region, and (3) to limit Soviet influence. (11:1)
CENTCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) is one and one- half times larger than the United States and has 380 million people in 19 countries. It is so expansive that the western flank extends from Egypt to Kenya on the west side of the Red Sea on the African continent. All of the Arabian Peninsula is in the AOR including Jordan. Four countries--Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan--are a multi-state buffer between the oil fields and what used to be the Soviet Union. The AOR's east-west expanse extends from China's and India's borders to Libya. (11:1)
The 19 countries within CENTCOM's area of responsibility are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, South Yemen, North Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. (Note that Syria, Lebanon, and Israel are in the European Command's AOR. When CENTCOM was formed, these three countries were not put in CENTCOM's AOR due to the animosity between Israel and the Arab states. (10:10-16) Because of their obvious proximity and influence in the region, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel will be considered with the CENTCOM countries in this paper.)
When one considers common sense, intuition, and recent headlines, the Middle East (which is in CENTCOM's AOR) is the world's most dangerous trouble spot. (8:27)
IRAN, IRAQ, AND SYRIA
The Iran-Iraq Gulf War of 1980 to 1988 was a flare-up of an old conflict between the Persians and their western neighbors over control of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the Shatt-al-Arab. The conflict has recurred with regularity since around 500 B.C. (8:96) Iran's problems stem from its "Islamic revolution" (Shiite Muslims).
Iraq, geographically centered, distrusts all of its neighbors; and even as it invaded Kuwait and became the target of an awesome allied forces, the Iraqi Baath regime still conducted war against the Kurds. (8:97)
Iraq was perceived as a threat to its neighbors and to U.S. interests and was ultimately devastated by the coalition of allied forces and their resources. (6:64) (See Appendix A).
Syria confronts Israel to the west and is embroiled in Lebanon. Syria has a real worry about Iraq, its centuries-old rival, which the Syrian Alawite (and Syrian Baath) regime regards as the second most regional enemy after Israel. (8:97)
Water may become an important factor influencing the politics and potential warfare in the region because Syria sits astride the Euphrates River, and Syrian dams back up water that Iraqis believe belongs to them. If access to the Euphrates River water becomes an issue of survival, Syria and Iraq, former Gulf War rivals, could become allies against Turkey, which controls Syrian access to the Euphrates. (8:97)
The current conflict in Lebanon is extremely complex. Lebanon in the 1940s through the 1960s had Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Sunni Muslims, and Shiites living together as in a Middle East Switzerland. Arab princes and businessmen from orthodox Muslim countries cavorted and did business, and the underground trade with Israel flourished; but displaced Palestinians living in refugee camps were not part of the major political and business activities, nor were the Syrians who envisioned Lebanon as an integral part of "Greater Syria". (8:38) The volatile consensus turned into armed fragments.
At the core of the conflict in Lebanon are three major issues: What should be done with the Arab Christians including a substantial minority of the Palestinian Christians? Where should the Palestinians go since the creation of Israel? How will the imperial ambitions of Syria be stopped or accommodated? (8:38)
Without going into detail, and to merely give a "flavor" of who is involved and the local politics of the Lebanese conflict -- here are some of the "players": Syria, Israel, Israeli-Arab Allies, Shiites, Iranian-controlled Shiites, Maronite Christians, Druze, Sunnis, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), PLO factions, Palestinians, Greek Orthodox, Armenians, Melchities, Protestants, United Nations, France, United States, Russia, and Iraq. (8:39-42)
The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow channel between the tip of Oman and Iran. Oil tankers traverse the Omani side where the water is deepest. The strait narrows to fifty kilometers in width and is extremely vulnerable to antiship missile batteries firing Exocet-type missiles or long range guns sited on nearby islands. Mines have been the weapons of choices--for example, Iran's mining of the Persian Gulf shallows during its war with Iraq. (8:135-196) CENTCOM's mission relates directly to keeping the oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz and will continue through the year 2000.
Historically, the Persian Gulf has been the site of strategic and regional conflict because of the United States, Japan's, and Western Europe's battle with the former Soviet Union over control of the oil-supply lines and because of various petty but deadly intertribal and ethnic squabbles that have existed for centuries. (8:138) The future holds the same potential for war.
Other factors adding fuel to the fire in the region include monarchism, geostrategic change, Islamic values and beliefs in a modern world, and the impact of wealth brought by oil -- these factors effect Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, and others on the Arabian Peninsula. (8:134)
Saudi Arabia relies on the United States as the guarantor of its existence even though the Saudis dislike the West and the presence of non-Islamic foreigners in their nation. It must be remembered that the two holiest cities of the Islamic faith, Medina and Mecca, are in Saudi Arabia. (8:140)
Saudi Arabia is the dominant oil rich country (one of six) in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which was formed in 1981 in response to Iran's threat. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have forty percent of the world's known oil reserves. Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are the other three members of the GCC. The governments in five of the six gulf states are Sunni Muslims. (10:12)
It is interesting to note that there was great concern during the Iran-Iraq war that if Iraq fell, Iran would pursue its Islamic fundamentalist movement throughout the Arabian Peninsula. (10:12) This concern may explain why the United States and the coalition forces did not devastate Iraq more than they did -- to leave a buffer against Iran. This may also account for, in part, why Saddam Hussein was not assassinated by allied forces; but Operation Desert Storm proved the United States resolve to protect the Arabian Peninsula and its valuable oil reserves and the free flow of oil.
After WWI, Britain's 1917 Balfour Declaration promised the Jews who had settled in the Ottoman-controlled Palestinian region a "Jewish home", but they promised the Arabs their own states, too. The WWI defeat of the Ottomans left the Arabian Peninsula and the Holy Land vulnerable to any politicians desiring to draw new maps. Many Palestinians went to Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria; and riots and armed battles occurred between Arabs and Jews in the 1920s. As time passed, Jewish leaders demanded that they be given a Jewish homeland pursuant to the Balfour Declaration. Although the British and French tried to stall a response to the demand, Hitler's Holocaust made Western opposition to a Zionist state impossible. Irgun terrorism against the British prompted the creation of Israel. (8:67-68)
The Arab League did not agree that the Jews should get their homeland. Palestine, in their view, had been Arab since the prophet's imperialist forces overran the Jordan Valley except for that period when the Latin Crusader states occupied the area for a couple of centuries. Israel appeared to be Jewish Crusaders backed by the West -- the United States, ultimately -- with weapons, money, and strong moral support. The situation was natural for the Arabs to get their support from what was then the Soviet Union. (8:67-68)
Regarding a historic, Biblical, moral, or legal claim to Palestine -- Palestinians are primarily descendants of those Semites who occupied Palestine from time immemorial -- the Canaanites and other Semitic tribes. They are also descendants of Jews who were taken into captivity by the Assyrians or the Babylonians and ultimately absorbed by the remainder of the population. They also include the descendants of those non-Semites who may have remained behind after the Persians, Macedonians, Romans, and other conquerors had been driven out by the Arab invasion and who were completely Arabised by that invasion, including the remnants of the Crusaders. The Ottoman Muslim rule which lasted 400 years and which ended in 1917 did not alter the Arabic or Muslim structure of the people of Palestine. (5:6-7)
The point, arguably, is that contemporary Jews have no compelling religious, historical, moral, or legal claim to Palestine; they occupy the area as a result of sympathy for the Holocaust and by use of armed and often brutal, force, This historical tension between the Arabs and Jews, the Palestinian issue (a homeland), and Israel's refusal to withdraw from the areas it seized in the 1967 war pursuant to United Nations Resolution 242 are factors which can draw United States armed forces into armed conflict in the region especially since the U.S. has taken an often irrational support role toward Israel.
Israel's hard-line militant policies are appealing to Sephardic Jews who have been oppressed under Arab or pro-Arab regimes and who support the Likud, Begin's and Shamir's party. The various factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the "intifada" (Palestinian attempt to throw off their oppression), deep-seated religious differences, terrorism, a rapidly growing Arab population, and a horrendous inflation rate all are factors which suggest that a war involving major regional powers and nuclear arms involving Israel is a very dangerous possibility. (8:60)
FACTORS AFFECTING CENTCOM BY 2000
The fact that Middle East peace talks occurred in Madrid, Spain and in Washington, D.C. shows promise for peace in the region. Even though Israel initially threatened to not attend the meeting in Washington, U.S. leaders forced Yitzak Shamir's hand on the peace talks and did not give him time (when he was in Washington) to explain Israel's ten billion dollars loan needs for financing immigration of Soviet Jews. (17:A8)
While the peace talks were being planned, Israel announced that it would deport a dozen Palestinian activists. That decision temporarily disrupted plans to resume Mideast peace talks in Washington because Palestinian delegates planned to not attend. (24:A1) Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon joined Palestinians in delaying the departure of their negotiators for talks with Israel because of the decision to expel twelve Palestinians from occupied Arab territories. (4:A19)
On the eve of a new round of Middle East peace talks in Washington, the United States joined the United Nations Security Council in strongly condemning Israel's planned deportation of the twelve Palestinians. The fifteen members of the council voted unanimously to condemn the expulsion orders, calling them a violation of international law. They also asked Israel to halt all deportations and to allow deportees to return. The United States which had used its veto to shield its ally, Israel, so many times in the past, joined in council criticism of expulsions of Palestinians several times over the past year. (42:A8)
If the peace process would only proceed in good faith, there is a possibility that peace can be achieved at least as to the Palestinian issue; and Israeli peace negotiators said that they would be ready to bargain with Palestinians over limited self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (19:A11) The problem is that Israel's actions around the time of the peace talks (deportations) and at other times (to be discussed) belie an attitude desirous of peace. Jordan's King Hussein has stated publicly that he believes that Israeli leaders even "fear peace". (22:A23)
U.S. - ISRAELI RELATIONS
Israel is a key to peace in the most dangerous region of the world. The United States and how it handles Israel is even a greater key to peace in the region and the whole world if the U.S. chooses to be ingenious, tough, and fair. Because of the historical and religious ties between the U.S. and Israel (e.g., the Judeo-Christian commonality), because many Jews have been quick to label any criticism of Israel's policies as "anti-Semitic", and because the Israeli lobby (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee -- AIPAC) has such a strong influence on the U.S. government (especially Congress), U.S. policy in the past has been loathe to criticize or not support Israel and the U.S. continues to give weapons, money, and moral support to Israel. AIPAC was instrumental in swinging the votes necessary in Congress to authorize President Bush to go to war against Iraq. (37:A14-15)
It often appears that Israel does not want peace in the region; and despite President Bush's plea for restraint in weapons sales to the Middle East, the U.S. has trasferred approximately six billion dollars in arms to the region as reported by the Arms Control Association, a private research group. (32:A8) Thus, some may say the U.S., Israel's arch ally, does not want peace in the Middle East.
Israel's luster has become tarnished as the American Congress, President, and people have become more aware of how Israel operates and how what goes on in the Middle East does affect Americans at home. Probably the best way to illustrate the point is to study some media reports which are the only "intelligence" information most Americans will receive to learn of some of Israeli intransigence. (Appendix B)
Other factors which impose threats to CENTCOM's AOR include Iran's role in the region, Saddam Hussein's goals, Syria's goals, etc. The region is a powder keg waiting to explode, and the U.S. can either wait and watch it ignite or it can be a "broker" for peace in the region.
Because of the U.S. policy not to sanction Israel, Israel acts; and other armed factions and countries in the region react. It appears that Iran is going to retaliate against Israel, and this could mean more "terrorism" and possible hostage taking. Israel and Syria are two of the military giants in the region with Israel having 104,000 men under arms, 3,800 tanks, 11,000 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,400 artillery pieces while Syria has 300,000 men, 4,000 tanks, 4,300 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,650 artillery pieces. (45:110-111)
Perhaps one of the scariest factors posing a threat to CENTCOM is that as the old Soviet Union broke up, some of the states in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) still had tactical nuclear weapons. Shorter range tactical weapons could become "loose nukes". The Soviet arsenal contained about 15,000 of them (missiles, bombs, mines, and artillery shells). These weapons are portable and subject to less elaborate controls than are strategic missiles. (44:32)
If tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of C.I.S. states (which are predominantly Muslim) wind up in the hands of their radical Muslim brothers in CENTCOM's AOR -- a holocaust could occur. A tactical nuclear device capable of being detonated in a vehicle, a building, or a vacant lot becomes the ultimate "terror toy".
What used to be Soviet Central Asia (which include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) may become a new geopolitical battleground. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are the chief rivals for influence with the five resource-rich Central Asian republics. They are vying for access to markets, gold, cotton, and natural gas; and they are also racing to win the hearts and minds of more than fifty million Muslims newly released from seventy-four years of totalitarian rule. (36:28) A unified Islamic region from Soviet Central Asia extending through CENTCOM's AOR could pose a threat by 2000.
Turkey, a Muslim country, market-oriented and friendly to the U.S., has a head start on its rivals with its various projects; Iran, a close second, has a tenacious anti-American bent; Saudi Arabia wants to give Islamic services to people deprived of them for seven decades. (36:28-29)
Thus, the U.S. needs to get involved (economic development) to counter this new specter of a resurgent Islam with access to nuclear weapons. Recently an Italian undercover operation seized a small sample of plutonium-229 (part of a larger load), probably of Soviet origin, and probably destined for Iraq or Libya. (35:29) "Loose nukes" pose a threat for the future.
It has been reported that Libya tried to hire two Russian experts for its nuclear program, but the scientists turned down the offer because they were not offered enough money. (31:A11)
Pakistan has recently announced that it has the capacity to make an atomic bomb. (33:B12)
Iran has quietly bought billions of dollars worth of advanced fighter planes and tanks from Russia and other former Soviet republics raising fears that it could replace Iraq as the biggest menace to peace in the Persian Gulf. (14:A2) Iran finances Hezbollah, the Shiite Muslim guerrilla group. It is the parent movement for extremist factions that held most of Western hostages in Lebanon and was responsible for a suicide bombing that killed hundreds of U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983. (13:A2)
Iran has established bases in Sudan to train fundamentalist Muslim rebels, and this has caused consternation for the U.S., Egypt (Sudan's northern neighbor), and Tunisia (worried about terrorism). (12:A11)
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
JCS Publication 1-02 defines national military strategy as "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force." Thus, CENTCOM's three objectives -- to protect the oil, to protect maritime commerce, and to limit Soviet influence -- as a part of national military strategy are to be accomplished with military force or threat of its use. The first two objectives (protect the oil and shipping) are even more critical and complex today due to the jockeying for position as "leader of the pack" by some of the "players" -- whether a nation-state or a small, zealous, armed faction.
U.S. strategy and policy in the CENTCOM AOR have had another objective in the region: the protection and support of Israel at all costs. In the past, the U.S. has looked the other way when Israel, like an errant child, misbehaved; and the numerous votes of the U.S. and Israel (against the rest of the nations) in the U.N. often illustrated the point.
It appears that in recent times the U.S. has taken a more objective stance in dealing with Israel as shown by its "brokerage" of the Middle East Peace talks and its condemnation of the deportation of Palestinians. Still, the U.S. must do more for the best interests of the U.S. -- not Israel. If, in order to control Israel, the U.S. must cease giving weapons, money, and moral support, then it must do so. If the U.S. does not have the will to act decisively or cannot act in this regard, as stated previously, the Middle East is a powder keg waiting to explode. The real problem is that the explosives may not be dynamite, but nuclear.
Desert Storm should be the vehicle for the U.S. to take this initiative and continue to aggressively exploit its positive relationships with the Arab states who were part of the coalition against Iraq to bring peace to the region.
U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE AND JOINT DOCTRINE
It has been said that the U.S. is the only Western power that can intervene in the Persian Gulf region in a moderate to high level conflict; but it will be critically limited by the availability of bases and facilities in the area; and the size of the U.S. forces committed will be limited by strategic and airlift capabilities. (7:109)
Desert Storm proved that other Western and Arab powers can intervene in the region, but under the aegis of the U.S. The victory of Desert Storm should not lull the U.S. into believing it will be so lucky to have a future foe in the region who will allow the U.S. several months to transport its military personnel and materiel to the locale to do battle. Nor should Americans believe that future wars in the region will be as bloodless as was the war against Iraq. (6:206)
If the U.S. must respond to future contingencies, it will need the same kinds of forces and equipment used in Desert Storm. It will especially need more sealift capability to get more U.S. tanks there to defend the troops from enemy armored attacks and more anti-mine and amphibious operations capabilities. The 82nd Airborne and the Marines got to Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield) quickly but were vulnerable to armored attack. Eight fast sealift ships took nearly a month to transport the 24th Infantry, a mechanized division. (41:20-21) Army divisions will be smaller, but need to be an effective mix of armor, light infantry, and airmobile. "Airborne" should be smaller numbers.
Because of the various strains on the U.S. economy, the military budget will be cut, and personnel and weapons systems will be cut dramatically. The U.S. will have to do more with less, but better, in 2000.
There needs to be new thinking in all of the services in terms of accomplishing missions -- use of hi-tech equipment as shown by Desert Storm, more sealift, intelligent and effective use of air power, less use of strategic missiles and bombers, more use of reserve forces, and more emphasis on "intelligence". Force structure will be reconstituted and "joint operations" will be the rule -- not the exception.
To strengthen intelligence support to combat commanders, the Department of Defense is combining the analysis of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands and their components into Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) under the control of designated Unified and Specified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). This will save resources by cutting duplicative efforts and will strengthen support to the CINCs and components through improved efficiency. (3:6) The Defense Intelligence Agency will also be strengthened. (3:6)
Relating to "intelligence" and possibly other innovative missions is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAVs are less expensive than full sized aircraft, can be mounted with various sensors (radar, cameras, infrared detectors), involves no risk of loss of human life, and can even be armed. (40:119)
Because there will be major personnel reductions in all the services, the reserve components will be more integrated into operational requirements. Individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) can meet future mission requirements at reduced costs as troop program units (TPUs) and their personnel are cut back.
Military attorneys should be more readily available to perform missions for military personnel and to act as operational advisors to commanders. Certain corporate operations integrate legal counsel on a frequent basis; military operations should do the same because of the "CNN factor".
Special operations forces (SOF) will greatly support CENTCOM missions through 2000. SOF were used in Desert Storm with great success.
The bottom line is that force structure and equipment for future CENTCOM missions will have to be "reconstituted", capable of rapid deployment to the AOR, be "high-tech", be armor and mechanized infantry oriented for ground warfare; "intelligence" will be improved; and the doctrine will be "joint operations". Through 2000, air power will be similar to that used against Iraq, but the Air Force command structures will be stream-lined.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The history of the Middle East (CENTCOM's AOR) clearly is a guide for the future -- there has been, is now, and will be armed conflicts in the AOR through 2000. Regional wars, terrorism, hostage taking, and the horrendous possibility of a nuclear detonation are all contingencies for which CENTCOM must be prepared and have a forward presence.
CENTCOM force structure must be capable of rapid deployment and crisis response; the present prepositioning of materiel in the region must be maintained and enhanced; there will be a greater reliance on "hi-tech" weapons and a combination of active and reserve forces because the U.S. ecomomy cannot afford opulent expenditures on national defense; and the U.S. will have to become more internationally politically involved in the Middle East -- the "coalition" concept.
The U.S. relied on the United Nations extensively prior to executing Desert Storm as evidenced by the U.N. resolutions posed prior to going to war (Appendix C); and recently, world leaders who met at the first Security Council summit in history, pressed the United Nations to have a stronger role in dealing with crises, protecting human rights, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and arms control. (38:A13) It should also be remembered that the U.N. chose Butros Ghali of Egypt (an Arab) as the Secretary General. (2:A2)
Thus, the U.S. will have to deal with the Arab mindset and culture in CENTCOM and in the U.N. more than before. Principles of international law will be touted more than before because of an increased role by the United Nations. Military lawyers, knowledgeable in international law, expecially the "law of war", will be invaluable to CENTCOM. They were everywhere during the Gulf War working in headquarters of CENTCOM, sleeping in the sands alongside troops in the field, negotiating host-nation agreements, and advising commanders on the legal implications of targeting decisions and weapons use. (30:52)
"Warriors" knowledgeable in the customs, values, and history of the Middle East will also be invaluable to CENTCOM's mission. More U.S. military personnel should be trained to speak, read, and write Arabic and to learn about the Arabic culture as we learned about the "Soviets". These "warriors" must also be "joint doctrine" oriented -- they need to know and work with their "sister" services.
Whether the U.S. goes to war or promotes peace in CENTCOM, the U.S. will have to establish itself as a "player", not as an antagonist, in the Middle East. The potential consequences are too devastating for the U.S. to ignore a more pro-Arab posture in the region. No country, including Israel, is worth the risk of nuclear holocaust, especially when that "country" may be a significant part of the problem. Rethinking this particular issue will be the U.S.'s most difficult policy challenge.
ALLIED FORCES IN THE GULF THEATER (6:64)
AFGHANISTAN ...... 300 Mujahedin troops
ARGENTINA ...... 1 destroyer, 1 corvette, 2 air force transport planes
AUSTRALIA ...... 1 guided-missile destroyer, 1 frigate, 1 supply ship, 2 surgical teams
BAHRAIN ...... 3,000 troops
BANGLADESH ...... 6,000 troops
BELGIUM ...... 1 frigate, 2 minesweepers, 2 landing ships, 1 supply ship, 6 C-130 transport planes
BRITAIN ...... 43,000 troops, 6 destroyers, 4 frigates, 3 minesweepers, 5 support ships, 168
tanks, 300 armored vehicles, 70 Tornado and Jaguar combat jets
CANADA ...... 2 destroyers, 1 supply ship, 12 C-130 transport planes, 24 CF-18 bombers
CZECHOSLOVAKIA ... 200 chemical-warfare specialists
DENMARK ...... 1 corvette
EGYPT ...... 40,000 troops, including 2 armored divisions and 5,000 Special Forces paratroopers
FRANCE ...... 18,000 troops, 60 combat aircraft, 120 helicopters, 40 tanks, 100 armored vehicles,1 missile cruiser, 3 destroyers, 4 frigates
GREECE ...... 1 frigate
HONDURAS ...... 150 troops
HUNGARY ...... 40 medical personnel
ITALY ...... 2 corvettes, 3 frigates, 1 supply ship, 4 minesweepers, 10 Tornado ground attack aircraft
JAPAN ...... medical personnel and supplies
KUWAIT ...... 11,000 troops
MOROCCO ...... 1,700 troops
THE NETHERLANDS... 2 frigates, 1 supply ship
NEW ZEALAND ...... 3 C-130 Hercules transport planes, 1 medical team
NIGER ...... 500 troops
NORWAY ...... 1 Coast Guard cutter, 1 transport ship
OMAN ...... 25,500 troops, 63 airplanes, 4 Exocet- armed ships
PAKISTAN ...... 7,000 troops
THE PHILIPPINES... medical personnel
POLAND ...... 2 rescue ships
PORTUGAL ...... 1 naval logistics ship
QATAR ...... 1 squadron of Mirage F-1E fighter planes
ROMANIA ...... 360 medical personnel, 180 chemical warfare experts
SAUDI ARABIA...... 118,000 troops, 550 tanks, 180 combat planes, 8 frigates
SENEGAL ...... 500 troops
SIERRA LEONE...... 30 medical personnel
SINGAPORE ...... 35-man medical team
SOUTH KOREA ...... 5 C-130 Hercules transport planes, 150-man medical team
SPAIN ...... 1 frigate, 2 corvettes, 1 supply ship, 1 C-130 transport plane
SWEDEN ...... field hospital and medical personnel
SYRIA ...... 17,000 troops, 300 T-62 tanks
EMIRATES ...... 40,000 troops, 80 combat planes, 15 ships, 200 tanks
UNITED STATES ... 540,000 troops, 6 aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, 2,000 tanks, 2,200 armored personnel carriers, 1,700 helicopters, 100 warships, 1,800 airplanes
MEDIA REPORTS REGARDING ISRAEL
In one editorial, the writer pointed out that the recently dedicated Navy memorial would not have a plaque commemorating one of the Navy's most heroic incidents -- the brutal and unprovoked attack by Israeli warplanes and torpedo boats on the U.S.S. Liberty, a highly armed and clearly marked intelligence gathering ship in international waters. (46:C3)
The Palestine Human Rights Information Center reported that Israeli interrogators have used electric-shock torture to extract confessions from prisoners in the occupied territories. (27:A9)
The New York Times reported that Israel sold several billion dollars in American-made weapons to Iran in the early 1980s with the knowledge of the United States under an agreement worked out by the Reagan administration. The U.S. rescinded the agreement in 1982 after it was determined that the Israeli defense minister was selling military materiel without Washington's permission. (34:A9)
Another editorial accused Israel as having something in common with Saddam Hussein's Iraq -- both disregard U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Israel's stated intent to deport twelve Palestinians was criticized. (9:A14)
It has been reported that Israel is opening relations with China, the last world power to embrace communism. (21:A10)
The Israeli army has banned Palestinian pedestrian traffic in the occupied West Bank at night. Although over 100,000 Jews live in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip area, 1.75 million Palestinians live there. The recent rapid expansion of Israeli settlements on the Palestinians' homeland has been condemned internationally as an obstacle to peace. (16:A15)
Yitzak Shamir kicked off his re-election campaign recently with a promise to build more Jewish settlements in the occupied territories while the United States contends that the settlements are an obstacle to peace with the over 1.7 million Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (23:A9)
The Israeli army said it would beef up its forces in the occupied West Bank by twenty percent by adding more regular soldiers and special units allegedly to try to halt attacks on Jewish settlers. This move follows demands by settlers for better protection and tougher treatment for Arab militants. It also comes amid Shamir's political crisis in which his coalition has lost its majority in the Knesset (parliament) because of defections by far-right leaders who are the settler's main supporters. (20:A9)
The Israeli army has "widened" its rules on firing on Arabs. A military source said new regulations would lessen the danger to soldiers implying that the soldiers may be allowed to fire live ammunition directly at a suspect without warning if they believe their lives are in danger. (25:A4)
At least four Jewish settlers have been shot since October 1991 prompting retaliatory raids by the settlers. Radical Palestinian groups were blamed for the shootings. At least 879 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli solders or civilians since the "intifada" began over four years ago. Seventy-seven Israelis have died. (25:A4)
In a recent editorial it was reported that there was high level corruption in Israel's military and industrial establishments which have siphoned off millions of dollars in American aid. Some of the missing money was believed to have been used for Israeli espionage in the United States -- Israel denies this. What is undisputed is that key figures in Israel's procurement program have diverted millions of dollars into their own pockets. (1:A12)
Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's Prime Minister, recently said that Israel is no longer obligated to strictly follow the Camp David accords which outline a plan for Palestinian autonomy in the occupied lands. This was the first time an Israeli leader questioned Israel's commitment to the 1978 U.S. - brokered accords which serve as a basis for U.S. and Israeli diplomacy in the Middle East. (18:B12)
Recently, attackers believed to be Palestinians or Israeli Arabs killed three soldiers at a base in Israel near the occupied West Bank. Only hours later, Israel aircraft attacked Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in retaliation. Fixed winged aircraft and helicopters fired rockets into an alleged PLO headquarters house; two rockets hit the outskirts of a refugee camp killing four Lebanese civilians including two children and a woman, and wounding six persons, and badly damaging three residential buildings. (15:A21)
It was reported that this revenge strike by Israel could seriously damage the Middle East peace process because the rocket-firing helicopters killed the leader of Lebanon's pro-Iran Hezbollah guerilla group. Sheik Abbas Musawi, his wife, and their five-year-old son were burned alive in what Hezbollah called "a cowardly air attack". (29:A1)
Hezbollah (Party of God) was considered to be the umbrella group for Shiite Muslim holders of Western hostages in Lebanon. It opposes the Middle East peace talks, and Shiite Muslim leaders vowed revenge and called for a holy war against Israel. (29:A1)
Without knowing for certain who killed the three Israeli soldiers, Israel has engaged in massive, indiscriminate retaliation killing innocent women and children, killing a Shiite leader (Musawi) who helped to arrange the release of American and British hostages in Lebanon last year.
An Israeli tank force, helicopter gunships, and a bulldozer flattened United Nations barricades, and the Israelis attacked two Lebanese villages to hunt for Shiite Muslim guerrillas who have been rocketing Israel. The U.N. peacekeepers tried to block the Israeli invasion, and fistfights broke out before the Israeli soldiers plowed through and seized two Lebanese villages. The Israeli invasion, just north of its self-declared security zone, drew a sharp protest from U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Ghali who called for an immediate withdrawal. The Bush administration expressed "deep concern". (28:A1)
Twenty-four hours after storming two villages in Lebanon, Israeli forces withdrew. Meanwhile, Israel again failed to win U.S. agreement for ten billion dollars in loan guarantees. (26:A1)
Secretary of State Baker recently demanded that Israel freeze settlements in the occupied territories to get ten billion dollars in U.S. loan guarantees as the Middle East peace talks resumed recently. The demand delighted Arabs but seemed likely to provoke an open crisis with Israel, possibly causing a break after decades during which Washington has acted as unquestioning ally and banker for the Jewish state. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir was defiant, but Baker gave Israel alternatives -- build the settlements and not get the loan guarantees, or not build and get them. (43:A1)
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (39:A12)
August 3, 1990 -- Resolution 660 -- The Council voted 14-0 to condemn the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Yemen, the only Arab member of the Council did not vote.
August 6, 1990 -- Resolution 661 -- The Council voted 13-0 to order a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
August 9, 1990 -- Resolution 662 -- The Council voted 15-0 to declare Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void under international law.
August 18, 1990 -- Resolution 664 -- The Council voted 15-0 to demand that Iraq free all detained foreigners.
August 25, 1990 -- Resolution 665 -- The Council voted 13-0 to give the United States and other naval powers the right to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq and Kuwait by halting shipping to those countries. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
September 13, 1990 -- Resolution 666 -- The Council voted 13-2 to allow humanitarian food aid into Iraq or Kuwait only "to relieve human suffering", and said only the Council could decide when those circumstances existed. Cuba and Yemen voted against the measure.
September 15, 1990 -- Resolution 667 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's aggressive acts against diplomatic missions in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreigners from the buildings.
September 24, 1990 -- Resolution 669 -- The Council voted 15-0 to stress that only its Sanctions Committee had the power to permit food, medicine or other humanitarian aid to be sent into Iraq or occupied Kuwait.
September 25, 1990 -- Resolution 670 -- The Council voted 14-1 to explicitly expand its economic embargo to include all air cargo traffic in or out of Iraq and Kuwait except for cargoes of humanitarian aid specifically authorized by its Sanctions Committee. It also called on U.N. member nations to detain any Iraqi ships that may be used to break the naval embargo. Cuba opposed the measure.
October 29, 1990 -- Resolution 674 -- The Council voted 13-0 to hold Iraq liable for war damages and economic losses, to ask nations to collect evidence of grave human rights abuses by the occupying forces, to demand that the Western embassies in Kuwait City be restocked with food and water, and to demand all hostages be released. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
November 28, 1990 -- Resolution 677 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's attempt to alter the demographic character of Kuwait and asked Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to take possession of Kuwait's census and citizenship records for safekeeping.
November 29, 1990 -- Resolution 678 -- The Council voted 12-2 to authorize the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991.
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2. "African Selected As Next U.N. Leader", Arizona Republic, November 22, 1991, A2.
3. Andrews, Duane, Assistant Secretary of Defense, "Restructuring Defense Intelligence", American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn 1991, p. 6.
4. "Arab Nations Assail Israel Expulsion Plan", Arizona Republic, January 5, 1992, A19.
5. Baker, William W., Theft of a Nation, Defender Publications, Las Vegas, Nevada, 1984, pp. 6-7.
6. Cave, Ray and Pat Ryan, Ed., Triumph In The Desert, New York, Random House, 1991.
7 . Cordesman, Anthony H., "U.S. Power Projection Capabilities in the Gulf, Indian Ocean and Red Sea", reprint from Armed Forces, December 1988, pp. 566-570, Air War College Associate Studies Vol. II, LSN 33, 1st Ed., p. 109.
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10. Florey, LTC Gregory D., USAF, Geographic Primer of CENTCOM's Area of Responsibility, Air War College Associate Studies Vol. II, LSN 32, 1st Ed.
11. Florey, LTC Gregory D., USAF, "Introduction", United States Central Command, Air War College Associate Studies Vol. II, LSN 32, 1st Ed., p. 1.
12. "Iran Bases Reported In Sudan", Arizona Republic, January 15, 1992, p. A11.
13. "Iran Finances Hezbollah", Arizona Republic, February 17, 1992, p. A2.
14. "Iran Spending Billions To Buy Soviet Arsenal", Arizona Republic, January 19, 1992, p. A2.
15. "Israel Attacks Camps In Wake Of Slayings", Arizona Republic, February 16, 1992, p. A21.
16. "Israel Bans West Bank Pedestrians At Night", Arizona Republic, December 15, 1991, p. A15.
17. "Israel Irate On Talks Site, But Meetings Not Doomed", Arizona Republic, November 25, 1991, p. A8.
18. "Israel: Not Bound By '78 Accords", Arizona Republic, February 8, 1992, p. B12.
19. "Israel Ready To Talk Of Self-Rule", Arizona Republic, January 15, 1992, p. A11.
20. "Israel To Increase Security For West Bank Settlers", Arizona Republic, January 22, 1992, p. A9.
21. "Israeli-Chinese Ties About To Come Into Open", Arizona Republic, January 10, 1992, p. A10.
22. "Israeli Leaders Fear Peace, Jordan's Hussein Says", Arizona Republic, December 1, 1991, p. A23.
23. "Israeli Leader Plans To Defy U.S.", Arizona Republic, January 21, 1992, p. A9.
24. "Israeli Plan To Deport 12 Angers U.S.", Arizona Republic, January 4, 1992, p. A1.
25. "Israeli Soldiers Given Latitude", Arizona Republic, February 3, 1992, p. A4.
26. "Israeli Troops Pull Back, Guerrilla Rocket Kills Girl", Arizona Republic, February 22, 1992, p. A1.
27. "Israelis Accused of Torture", Arizona Republic, December 4, 1991, p. A9.
28. "Israelis Invade Lebanese Villages", Arizona Republic, February 21, 1992, p. A1.
29. "Israelis Kill Key Shiite", Arizona Republic, February 17, 1992, p. A1.
30. Keeva, Steven, "Lawyers In The War Room", ABA Journal, December 1991, p. 52.
31. "Libya Trying To Hire Russian Atomic Elite", Arizona Republic, January 9, 1992, p. A11.
32. "Mideast Is Sent $6 Billion In Arms, Despite Bush Plea", Arizona Republic, February 15, 1992, p. A8.
33. "Pakistan Can Build An A-Bomb", Arizona Republic, February 8, 1992, p. B12.
34. "Paper: Israel Sold U.S. Arms To Iran", Arizona Republic, December 8, 1991, p. A9.
35. Post, Tom, et. al., "Selling Nuclear Missiles and Minds", Newsweek, January 13, 1992, p. 29.
36. Post, Tom, et al., "The Great Game, Chapter Two", Newsweek, February 3, 1992, p. 28.
37. "Pro-Israel Lobbyists Quietly Backed Resolution Allowing Bush to Commit U.S. Troops to Combat", Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1991, pp. A14-A15.
38. "Stronger Role In Crisis Planned", Arizona Republic, Feburary 1, 1992, p. A13.
39. "The U.N. Resolutions Against Iraq," Washington Times, February 22, 1991, p. A12.
40. Time-Life Books, Ed., "Robots For Overhead Surveillance", The New Face of War, Electronic Spies, Alexandria, Virginia, 1991, p. 119.
41. Turque, Bill, et al., "Rethinking The Lessons Of Desert Storm", Newsweek, January 20, 1992, pp. 20-21.
42. "U.S. Joins Attack On Israel Deportations", Arizona Republic, January 27, 1992, p. A8.
43. "U.S. Tougher On Israel Aid", Arizona Republic, February 25, 1992, p. A1.
44. Watson, Russel, and John Barry, "Nukes On The Loose", Newsweek, December 16, 1991, p. 32.
45. Westhrop, Chris, Ed., The World's Armies, New York, Military Press, 1991, pp. 110-111.
46. "Why 34 Dead Sailors Will Not Be Honored At The Navy Memorial", Arizona Republic, November 17, 1991, p. C3.