This is a paper I wrote for the Air War College in October, 1991.
I believe it still has relevance today.
Joe Abodeely
December,1998
AIR WAR COLLEGE ASSOCIATE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY
LAW OF WAR CONSIDERATIONS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT OF IRAQ
IN OPERATION DESERT STORM
A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE VOLUME I OPTION THREE
October 1991
CERTIFICATE
I have read and understand the Academic Integrity Section of
the Program Guide, I certify that the creative process of
researching, organizing, and writing this research report
represents only my own work.
Joseph E. Abodeely
DISCLAIMER
This research report represents the views of the author and
does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air
War College of the Department of the Air Force. In accordance
with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is
the property of the United States government and is not to be
reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the
Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Air War College Research Report Abstract
Title: Law of War Considerations of Aerial Bombardment of
Iraq in Operation Desert Storm
Author: Joseph E. Abodeely, Colonel, USAR
Analysis and remarks on how Desert Storm occurred and how political and legal considerations were used to justify U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Some of the principles relating to the law of war are discussed in the context of United States' and coalition forces' aerial bombardments of Iraqi forces. The aerial campaign is considered to have probably violated the law of war. Rhetorical questions in the author's conclusions suggest more preferable alternative courses of actions which the United States could have taken.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
COLONEL JOE ABODEELY, U.S. Army Reserves, is currently assigned as Chief, Law Branch of U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA). His legal duties impact on Department of Army policy, including clarifying USAMPOA responsibilities relating to war crimes.
Previous assignments include Staff Judge Advocate (IMA), 11th ADA Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas; Judge Advocate, Military Police Company Commander, Arizona Army National Guard.
During the Tet Offensive, 1968, Vietnam, then 1st Lieutenant Abodeely served with 2/7 Bn, 1st Air Cavalry Division. As reported in the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, April 8, 1968 -- "... Abodeely, 24, of Tucson, Ariz. and his platoon formed the 1st Air Cavalry spearhead of the 20,000 man Operation Pegasus drive that broke the Communist grip around Khe Sanh in a week long drive that covered 12 miles of jungle, hills, and minefields..."
Decorations include combat infantryman's badge, bronze star, air medal, Vietnam service medal with gold star, Vietnamese cross of gallantry with palm (unit citation), and others.
Colonel Abodeely received his R.O.T.C. commission, B.A. degree (English), and Juris Doctor from the University of Arizona.
He served 14 1/2 years as a Maricopa Deputy County Attorney (Prosecutor) where he prosecuted major felony cases, supervised and trained numerous attorneys, provided training to various law enforcement agencies (state and federal) and served as legal advisor on special "sting" and counter-narcotics projects with state and federal agencies.
Colonel Abodeely is presently an attorney (sole practitioner) in private practice which emphasizes criminal defense, administrative law, and military law.
He was a radio talk show host for five years and now hosts a talk-show on public access television.
He lives in Phoenix with his wife, Donna, two German Shepherds, and fourteen cats.
INTRODUCTION
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States, in conjunction with a coalition of armed forces from other countries, ultimately engaged in armed conflict with the military forces of Iraq to protect Saudi Arabia and to liberate occupied Kuwait.
The world public was informed of the diplomatic as well as the military aspects of the war and how the United Nations and the Congress and President of the United States sought to legitimize the conduct of the war through legal actions such as adoption of resolutions to justify military action.
One area of legal consideration relating to the war which had almost no media attention was the aerial bombardment of Iraq and the application of the "law of war" to that bombardment.
Because the rest of the world saw America's conduct of the war, and because other nations are concerned about humanitarian principles relating to the conduct of war, and because Americans have a basic respect for law and humanitarian principles -- it is necessary and wise to consider the potential and actual limitations on the use of air power.
THE THREAT
IRAQ WAS A PARTNER
In a witness statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 6, 1990, a person very knowledgeable of matters relating to the Middle East spoke about what he thought the United States should do regarding Iraq. To put the statement in context, one must remember that Iraq and Iran had been at war for several years; and the United States had supported Iraq. (7:115-118)
The senate witness said:
"The cease-fire with Iran has allowed Iraq to resume its bid for leadership and influence within the Arab world. Iraq ended the war with one of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world...
Even though it enjoys a significant post-war military advantage over Iran, Iraq continues to import arms. Of greater concern, however, is its domestic arms industry, the most advanced in the region...
Although generally mistrustful of the U.S., Iraq would welcome measured U.S. participation in its economic development. Currently, oil exports make it America's second largest Middle Eastern trading partner. The U.S. should continue to develop its contacts with Iraq by building selectively on existing political and economical relationships..." (20:86)
The significance of this testimony is:
(1) that it considered Iraq as a "partner" and not a "threat" to the United States;
(2) that a year later the United States was at war with Iraq; and
(3) that the testimony was given by General
H. Norman Schwartzkopf, the field commander of the forces to defeat Iraq. The most critical task in planning the defense of a nation is judging the nature and extent of the threats which may occur, given the structure and objectives of United States national security planning. (15:243) If Iraq were not truly a "threat" to United States interests, then the destruction wreaked upon Iraq's military and civilian populace is even more egregious irrespective of substantial compliance with "the law of war."
IRAQ BECOMES THE ENEMY
Why, then, did we go to war with Iraq? Arm-chair philosophers, military strategists, and cynics may pose the following reasons for Operation Desert Storm: (1) to protect the oil in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for the United States; (2) to protect the oil in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for America's allies in Europe and Japan; (3) to liberate the Kuwaiti people from Saddam Hussein and return them to the Emir of Kuwait; (4) to rid the world of Saddam Hussein; (5) to bring peace and stability to the Middle East; (6) to justify not cutting defense spending when the "Iron Curtain" (Berlin Wall) came down and U.S. military forces were being cut; (7) to justify using U.S. military forces rather than redeploying them to the United States to be discharged into a sagging economy; (8) to take American citizens' minds off of the sagging economy; (9) to divert American citizens' attention from the Savings and Loan debacle which involved highly prominent businesses, United States Senators, and even the President's son; (10) to help improve the President's ratings in the polls; and (11) to protect Israel. (21)
WORLD PUBLIC OPINION
The "why" of Desert Storm influences other nations' views of the "how" we conducted Desert Storm. If a large segment of the world's nations view United States military action in Desert Storm to have been unnecessary (e.g., Iraq was not a threat to U.S. interests), then they will probably view our military operations (e.g., aerial bombardments) to be in violation of the law of war and other accepted principles of international law relating to armed conflict.
U.S. POLICY FORMULATION
To help understand the "why" Iraq was a "threat" to the United States, it is important to note that at a press breakfast in Washington, D.C. on July 19, 1990, before intelligence information about the Iraqi troop buildup had leaked, Secretary of Defense Cheney was asked about Iraq's "threats" to Kuwait regarding an oil dispute. Cheney replied that the United States would take seriously any threat to U.S. interests or U.S. friends in the region. (27:210)
Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. policy had been unclear toward Iraq. President Bush's administration officials had talked tough about Saddam's threats against Israel, the movement of Iraqi SCUD missile launchers closer to Israel, and Iraq's efforts to illegally import components for nuclear weapons. Yet, at the same time, the administration had thwarted congressional efforts to impose economic sanctions on Iraq or cut U.S. food assistance. (27:211)
President Bush was deeply concerned about Saddam's ability to control the oil in the Middle East. Bush, the former Texas oil man, engaged in extended analysis with his close personal advisors regarding the impact on world oil availability and price. Bush was concerned with if the U.S. and other nations could embargo Iraqi oil and if Saddam would withhold Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil or try to flood the world market and the ultimate impact on U.S. oil resources. (27:226)
There may have been many reasons why Iraq became a threat which justified devastating military action against it, or there may have been no substantially valid reason to have justified Desert Storm. History will ultimately disclose why we went to war with Iraq.
LEGALIZING THE WAR
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
President Bush did an outstanding job of unifying nations to be the coalition of forces to defeat Iraq. He was able to influence the United Nations Security Council to give an air of legitimacy to the ultimate decimation of Iraq.
The Council passed resolutions relating to condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding immediate withdrawal, and ordering a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
The Council also voted to give the United States and other naval powers the right to enforce the economic embargo and to allow limited humanitarian food aid into Iraq or Kuwait.
Most importantly, as far as internationally legitimatizing U.S. warfare in the Persian Gulf area, the Council authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991. (24:A12) (See Appendix).
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
Once the President got the approval of the United Nations Security Council to use military force against Iraq, there was only one other legal obstacle to hurdle before the United States went to war -- Congressional acquiescence.
Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis had failed -- Bush demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and compliance with all of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions. (26:36-37) Saddam Hussein tried to "link" his withdrawal of forces from Kuwait to a commitment to a Middle East peace conference to settle the festering and long-time Palestinian issue. (5:24) The U.S. should have negotiated with Saddam, but as will be discussed later, the U.S. Israeli lobby in Congress had its own agenda.
There were still questions about the President's policy in the gulf crisis -- why there? Why now? Why the United States? These questions were in Congress's emotional debate that ultimately gave Bush a de facto declaration of war. By 67 votes in the House and only 5 votes in the Senate, Congress granted the President authority to use military force in the Persian Gulf even though there were forceful arguments from Congressmen that the U.N. embargo against Iraq should be allowed more time to work. (17:16-17)
Congress supported the President after being forced to recognize that a defeat for Bush within days of the U.N. deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait would have catastrophic consequences not only for the U.S. policy in the gulf, but for the international coalition against Iraq, too. (17:17) President Bush now had all the "legal" authority he needed to wage war against Iraq. Americans like to believe they do things lawfully.
THE LAW OF WAR
THE CONVENTIONS
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims and the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land were intended to be, and are, legally binding on the United States and its citizens, especially members of the armed forces. (6:1) The policy of the Department of Defense is to ensure: (1) that the law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by the U.S. armed forces; (2) that a program designed to prevent violations of the law of war is implemented by U.S. armed forces; and (3) that alleged violations of the law of war whether committed by or against U.S. or enemy personnel are promptly reported, thoroughly investigated, and corrective action is taken if appropriate. (10:1)
The law of war is derived from two principle sources -- Lawmaking Treaties (or Conventions) such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions and custom which is a body of unwritten or customary law firmly established by the custom of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law. (12:4)
AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS
For purposes of this analysis, the provisions of the Conventions relating to bombardments will be considered.
"The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." (12:19)
Of course, defended places such as forts, defended cities with military forces present or passing through, munitions factories, military supply camps, warehouses, transportation facilities, or other places devoted to support the military operations may be attacked or bombarded whether defended or not. (12:19)
The Conventions prohibit unnecessary killing and devastation:
"... loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained. Once a fort or defended locality has surrendered, only such further damage is permitted as is demanded by the exigencies of war, such as the removal of fortifications, demolition of military buildings, and destruction of stores." (12:20)
Specifically dealing with delivery of munitions from aerial platforms, the Hague Convention of 1907 said:
"There is no prohibition of general application against bombardment from the air of combatant troops, defended places, or other legitimate military objectives." (12:20)
INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS PROHIBITED
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts prohibits indiscriminate attacks on the enemy civilian populace.
"Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objective without distinction." (9:36)
The Protocol further states what may have the most direct application to consider of the United States' aerial bombardment of Iraq:
"Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." (9:36)
Did the United States violate the spirit and intent of the law of war relating to the bombing of Iraq? To answer this question, one must consider the air campaign over Iraq and its effects. This writer believes that the massive bombing campaigns on Iraqi civilian populated areas with "dumb" munitions probably violated the aforementioned considerations relating to the law of war.
AIR CAMPAIGN
GENERAL DUGAN WAS PROPHETIC
In September 1990, then Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael J. Dugan said that a massive bombing campaign against Baghdad that specifically targeted Saddam Hussein would be the only way to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. He said "the cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad," and other targets would include Iraqi power systems, roads, railroads, and perhaps domestic petroleum-production facilities except oil fields. He also said that Saddam Hussein, himself, should be specifically targeted. (4:A14)
General Dugan went so far as to say that he asked his planners to interview academics, journalists, ex military, and Iraqi defectors to determine what was unique about Iraqi culture that they put very high value on. (4:A14)
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney explained, after relieving General Dugan of his position, that "we never talk about targeting of specific individuals who are officials of other governments." He said that such action might be a violation of the standing presidential executive order prohibiting U.S. involvement in assassinations of foreign leaders. (23:A8)
BOMBING SADDAM AND LEADERSHIP TARGETS
Eventually Operation Desert Storm commanders ordered a massive search for an American-made motor home believed used by Hussein during a 42-day campaign to hunt down and kill him. In the opening hours of the war in mid-January, Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117 stealth bombers destroyed command bunkers Saddam was using in Baghdad. After the bunkers were destroyed, Air Force planes were divided into teams and patrolled areas likely to be travelled by Saddam's mobile command center. (25:A24)
Saddam survived, but were U.S. forces violating the executive order prohibiting assassination of foreign leaders; or was it just war as usual?
An embarrassment to the U.S. Bombing effort was the destruction on the Amiriya shelter in Baghdad at the cost of several hundred civilian lives. "Leadership targets" were high priority for bombing to get the Iraqi military high command and Baath leadership to overthrow Saddam. (8:20)
The effort to get the "leadership" failed, and the allies were unprepared for the presence of so many innocent family members. One visibly shaken Pentagon source was asked if the victims were in fact dependents of Iraq's ruling elite, and he said, "I don't know. (Burned) women and children all look much the same, don't they?" (8:20)
EFFECTS OF BOMBARDMENTS
What were the overall effects of the U.S. air raids in the Persian Gulf War? Greenpeace, the environmental protection organization conducted interviews with international relief workers, reporters, U.S. officials, and news reports. Greenpeace's report said that over 150,000 people died as a result of the war with Iraq and at least 5 million lost their homes or jobs. (14:A10)
The majority of the bombing casualties were caused by "dumb" bombs and by the 12 million to 16 million bomblets released by an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 cluster bombs dropped by allied planes. (14:A10)
As much as the U.S. media (which was fed its information by the military) portrayed the "smart bombs" striking targets, the truth is that the majority of the munitions hurled on Iraq and Kuwait were "dumb" bombs. Allied jets dropped 88,500 tons of bombs on Iraq and Kuwait, but about 70 percent of them missed their targets. The precision-guided bombs, the icon of Pentagon briefings and the military's preferred image of the war, made up barely 7 percent of the U.S. tonnage dropped on Iraqi targets, said General Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff. (11:A2)
A senior Pentagon official said 81,980 tons of "dumb" or unguided bombs had an accuracy of only about 25 percent. (11:A2) It is reasonable to conclude that there was a great deal of collateral damage -- not destruction of military targets -- caused by the extensive aerial bombardments of populated cities like Baghdad.
The extent of actual unnecessary death and destruction inflicted upon Iraqi non-military targets may never be known, but suffice to say that it is impossible to have conducted the awesome aerial bombardment of Baghdad and other populated areas of Iraq and not have inflicted massive civilian casualties.
AIR FORCE POLICY
The Department of the Air Force policy is that Air Force personnel will comply with the law of armed conflict (law of war) in the conduct of military operations. (3:1)
"The mass annihilation of enemy people is neither humane, permissible, nor militarily necessary. The Hague Regulations prohibit the destruction or seizure of enemy property 'unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.' Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law, and there must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of enemy forces." (1:5-9)
Air Force policy says that collateral damage should not be excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated from the attack, and in all operations every feasible precaution should be taken to keep civilian casualties and damage to a minimum. (2:3-3)
U.S. BOMBING PROBABLY WENT TOO FAR
There have been charges that America and its allies went too far in its bombing of Iraq.
"The Washington Post... said, 'Some targets, especially late in the war, were bombed primarily to create post war leverage over Iraq, not influence the course of the conflict itself.'" (13-A16)
If one couples what the United States failed to achieve in Operation Desert Storm (e.g., to save the oil, to save the Kuwaiti people, to get rid of Saddam, and to bring peace to the Middle East) with the less than clear justification to meet "the threat" and the aerial onslaught inflicted on Iraq -- a war crimes tribunal composed of objective judges (not members of the allied coalition) might be hard - pressed to justify U.S. aerial bombardment under principles of international law.
It is probable that the war with Iraq could have been avoided if the U.S. would have considered a Middle East peace conference to discuss the Palestinian issue, but somebody needed the war. If the war was not necessary, then the bombing of the innocent civilians in the populated areas of Iraq was unnecessary; and the aerial bombardments were violations of the law of war.
CONCLUSIONS
WAR MUST BE A LAST RESORT
Before the United States goes to war, the country must be certain that the enemy is truly a "threat" to justify the awesome lethal force America can dispense to its enemies.
The American people must not allow foreign powers to use special interest groups (like American-Israel Public Affairs Committee -- AIPAC) to pressure Congress to put the American military at war. (19:A14) Israel used the U.S. to neutralize a major Arab threat in Operation Desert Storm.
UNITED STATES PROBABLY VIOLATED LAW OF WAR
Once the decision to go to war is made (and assuming it's a morally, politically, legally, and militarily justifiable decision), the United States must conduct its military operations (including aerial bombardment) in compliance with the law of war. There was much "legal talk" and "legal maneuvering" to get the United States into the war with Iraq, but there was minimal adherence to the law of war by preventing unnecessary killing and devastation.
There is no way that the United States and the allied coalition could have conducted the number of sorties they conducted on the populated areas in Iraq with the over 90 percent "dumb" munitions they used -- and not have inflicted extensive unnecessary killing and devastation. The logic is inescapable. It is highly probable that the mass aerial bombing of highly populated areas in Iraq was "indiscriminate" bombing per se; however, the public will never know because the media was restricted in its reporting of the war casualties and bomb damage assessment.
No one can criticize the outstanding execution of the battlefield operations by the American military forces, but they probably violated the law of war. Would a truly objective war crimes tribunal considering the United States aerial bombardment campaign say it complied, in all instances, with the law of war? Probably not and the U.S. government, military, and people should be concerned if America is going to go to the U.N. to get approval on future military operations.
Nations have wrestled over the decades to try to establish workable rules to govern aerial bombardments, and their efforts have been controversial and not often easy. (18:1-225) Since many of the world's nations are concerned about how aerial bombardment is conducted by belligerents, the United States needs to be concerned not only in "word" but in "deed".
WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD HAVE DONE
Should the United States have avoided armed conflict with Iraq and accepted Iraq's proposal to "link" the Palestinian homeland issue with Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait to prevent the onslaught of Iraq? Should the United States have given the coalition embargo of supplies to Iraq more time to work? Should the United States have tried to effectuate a broad peace plan in the Middle East as it is trying to do now? Should the United States have reevaluated its relationship with Israel (who had demanded a $10 billion loan guarantee and who is continuing to settle Jews in the occupied areas contrary to U.S. and U.N. wishes) a long time ago and taken a firm stance against Israel then? (16:38-39)
The answer to these questions is a resounding YES if Americans truly believe in fair play and justice and the rule of law. Students and practitioners of the art of strategy and warfare must also consider these questions and issues because it is only when "the warrior" has intellectual discipline and integrity that he will be able to live up to what Sun Tzu said:
"... Thus, those who win one hundred triumphs in one hundred conflicts
Do not have supreme skill.
Those who have supreme skill,
Use strategy to bend others without coming to conflict..." (22:45)
The fact that the U.S. conducted the aerial bombardment of Iraq as it did shows that Americans (the people, the political leaders, and the military) still have much to learn about the morality, legality, and the art of war.
APPENDIX: UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
August 3, 1990 -- Resolution 660 -- The Council voted 14-0 to condemn the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Yemen, the only Arab member of the Council did not vote.
August 6, 1990 -- Resolution 661 -- The Council voted 13-0 to order a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
August 9, 1990 -- Resolution 662 -- The Council voted 15-0 to declare Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void under international law.
August 18, 1990 -- Resolution 664 -- The Council voted 15-0 to demand that Iraq free all detained foreigners.
August 25, 1990 -- Resolution 665 -- The Council voted 13-0 to give the United States and other naval powers the right to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq and Kuwait by halting shipping to those countries. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
September 13, 1990 -- Resolution 666 -- The Council voted 13-2 to allow humanitarian food aid into Iraq or Kuwait only "to relieve human suffering", and said only the Council could decide when those circumstances existed. Cuba and Yemen voted against the measure.
September 15, 1990 -- Resolution 667 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's aggressive acts against diplomatic missions in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreigners from the buildings.
September 24, 1990 -- Resolution 669 -- The Council voted 15-0 to stress that only its Sanctions Committee had the power to permit food, medicine or other humanitarian aid to be sent into Iraq or occupied Kuwait.
September 25, 1990 -- Resolution 670 -- The Council voted 14-1 to explicitly expand its economic embargo to include all air cargo traffic in or out of Iraq and Kuwait except for cargoes of humanitarian aid specifically authorized by its Sanctions Committee. It also called on U.N. member nations to detain any Iraqi ships that may be used to break the naval embargo. Cuba opposed the measure.
October 29, 1990 -- Resolution 674 -- The Council voted 13-0 to hold Iraq liable for war damages and economic losses, to ask nations to collect evidence of grave human rights abuses by the occupying forces, to demand that the Western embassies in Kuwait City be restocked with food and water, and to demand all hostages be released. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
November 28, 1990 -- Resolution 677 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's attempt to alter the demographic character of Kuwait and asked Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to take possession of Kuwait's census and citizenship records for safekeeping.
November 29, 1990 -- Resolution 678 -- The Council voted 12-2 to authorize the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait
after January 15, 1991. (24:A12)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. AFP 110-31, International Law -- The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, Department of the Air Force, Washington, GPO, 19 November 1976.
2. AFP 110-34, Commander's Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Department of the Air Force, Washington, GPO, 25 July 1980.
3. AFR 110-32, Training and Reporting to Insure Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict, Department of the Air Force, Washington, GPO, 2 August 1976.
4. "Air War Called Best Option By U.S. Brass", Arizona Republic, September 16, 1990, p. A14.
5. Alter, Jonathan, "Why 'Linkage' Doesn't Connect", Newsweek, January 21, 1991, p. 24.
6. AR 350-216, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, Department of the Army, Washington, GPO, 7 March 1975.
7. Armacost, Michael H., Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Reagan Administration, "U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging", reprint of a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 16 June 1987, Air War College Associate Studies Vol. II, LSN 33, 1st Ed., pp. 115-118.
8. Barry, John, and Douglas Waller, "What Really Happened", Newsweek, February 25, 1991, p. 20.
9. DAP 27-1-1, Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Department of the Army, Washington, GPO, September 1979.
10. Department of Defense, DoD Law of War Program, DoD Directive 5100.77, Washington, GPO, July 10, 1979.
11. "88, 500 Tons of Bombs -- 70% Missed", Arizona Republic, March 16, 1991, p. A2.
12. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Department of the Army, Washington, GPO, July 1956.
13. "Gulf Air-War Leader Denies Reports Allies Overbombed Iraq", Arizona Republic, June 29, 1991, p. A16.
14. "Gulf War Resulted In 150,000 Deaths, Greenpeace Says", Arizona Republic, May 29, 1991, p. A10.
15. Hartmann, Frederick H. and Robert L. Wendzel, "Defense Planning Problems", reprint from Defending America's Security, 1988, pp. 132-149, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., Air War College Associate Studies Vol. I, LSN 6, 1st Ed., pp. 241-250.
16. Lane, Charles, et al., "A Marriage On The Rocks", Newsweek, September 30, 1991, pp. 38-39.
17. Morganthau, Tom, et al., "Bracing for War", Newsweek, January 21, 1991, pp. 16-19.
18. Parks, W. Hays, "Air War and the Law of War", Air Force Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1990, pp. 1-225.
19. "Pro-Israel Lobbyists Quietly Backed Resolution Allowing Bush to Commit U.S. Troops to Combat", Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1991, pp. A14-A15.
20. Schwartzkopf, Gen. H. Norman, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, reprint of a Witness Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 6, 1990, Air War College Associate Studies Vol, II, LSN 33, 1st Ed., pp. 80-103.
21. Students' discussion in Air War College seminar number 058A, 1991.
22. Sun Tzu, The Art of Strategy, translated by R.L. Wing, New York, Doubleday, 1988.
23. Thompson, Mark, "Air Force Chief is Fired", Arizona Republic, September 18, 1990, pp. A1, A8.
24. "The U.N. Resolutions Against Iraq," Washington Times, February 22, 1991, p. A12.
25. "U.S. Led Iraq Hunt For Motor Home Carrying Saddam", Arizona Republic, June 23, 1991, p. A24.
26. Watson, Russell, et al., "Why Diplomacy Failed", Newsweek, March 4, 1991, pp. 36-37.
27. Woodward, Bob, The Commanders, Simon and Schuster, 1991.
I believe it still has relevance today.
Joe Abodeely
December,1998
AIR WAR COLLEGE ASSOCIATE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY
LAW OF WAR CONSIDERATIONS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT OF IRAQ
IN OPERATION DESERT STORM
A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE VOLUME I OPTION THREE
October 1991
CERTIFICATE
I have read and understand the Academic Integrity Section of
the Program Guide, I certify that the creative process of
researching, organizing, and writing this research report
represents only my own work.
Joseph E. Abodeely
DISCLAIMER
This research report represents the views of the author and
does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air
War College of the Department of the Air Force. In accordance
with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is
the property of the United States government and is not to be
reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the
Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Air War College Research Report Abstract
Title: Law of War Considerations of Aerial Bombardment of
Iraq in Operation Desert Storm
Author: Joseph E. Abodeely, Colonel, USAR
Analysis and remarks on how Desert Storm occurred and how political and legal considerations were used to justify U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Some of the principles relating to the law of war are discussed in the context of United States' and coalition forces' aerial bombardments of Iraqi forces. The aerial campaign is considered to have probably violated the law of war. Rhetorical questions in the author's conclusions suggest more preferable alternative courses of actions which the United States could have taken.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
COLONEL JOE ABODEELY, U.S. Army Reserves, is currently assigned as Chief, Law Branch of U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA). His legal duties impact on Department of Army policy, including clarifying USAMPOA responsibilities relating to war crimes.
Previous assignments include Staff Judge Advocate (IMA), 11th ADA Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas; Judge Advocate, Military Police Company Commander, Arizona Army National Guard.
During the Tet Offensive, 1968, Vietnam, then 1st Lieutenant Abodeely served with 2/7 Bn, 1st Air Cavalry Division. As reported in the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, April 8, 1968 -- "... Abodeely, 24, of Tucson, Ariz. and his platoon formed the 1st Air Cavalry spearhead of the 20,000 man Operation Pegasus drive that broke the Communist grip around Khe Sanh in a week long drive that covered 12 miles of jungle, hills, and minefields..."
Decorations include combat infantryman's badge, bronze star, air medal, Vietnam service medal with gold star, Vietnamese cross of gallantry with palm (unit citation), and others.
Colonel Abodeely received his R.O.T.C. commission, B.A. degree (English), and Juris Doctor from the University of Arizona.
He served 14 1/2 years as a Maricopa Deputy County Attorney (Prosecutor) where he prosecuted major felony cases, supervised and trained numerous attorneys, provided training to various law enforcement agencies (state and federal) and served as legal advisor on special "sting" and counter-narcotics projects with state and federal agencies.
Colonel Abodeely is presently an attorney (sole practitioner) in private practice which emphasizes criminal defense, administrative law, and military law.
He was a radio talk show host for five years and now hosts a talk-show on public access television.
He lives in Phoenix with his wife, Donna, two German Shepherds, and fourteen cats.
INTRODUCTION
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States, in conjunction with a coalition of armed forces from other countries, ultimately engaged in armed conflict with the military forces of Iraq to protect Saudi Arabia and to liberate occupied Kuwait.
The world public was informed of the diplomatic as well as the military aspects of the war and how the United Nations and the Congress and President of the United States sought to legitimize the conduct of the war through legal actions such as adoption of resolutions to justify military action.
One area of legal consideration relating to the war which had almost no media attention was the aerial bombardment of Iraq and the application of the "law of war" to that bombardment.
Because the rest of the world saw America's conduct of the war, and because other nations are concerned about humanitarian principles relating to the conduct of war, and because Americans have a basic respect for law and humanitarian principles -- it is necessary and wise to consider the potential and actual limitations on the use of air power.
THE THREAT
IRAQ WAS A PARTNER
In a witness statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 6, 1990, a person very knowledgeable of matters relating to the Middle East spoke about what he thought the United States should do regarding Iraq. To put the statement in context, one must remember that Iraq and Iran had been at war for several years; and the United States had supported Iraq. (7:115-118)
The senate witness said:
"The cease-fire with Iran has allowed Iraq to resume its bid for leadership and influence within the Arab world. Iraq ended the war with one of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world...
Even though it enjoys a significant post-war military advantage over Iran, Iraq continues to import arms. Of greater concern, however, is its domestic arms industry, the most advanced in the region...
Although generally mistrustful of the U.S., Iraq would welcome measured U.S. participation in its economic development. Currently, oil exports make it America's second largest Middle Eastern trading partner. The U.S. should continue to develop its contacts with Iraq by building selectively on existing political and economical relationships..." (20:86)
The significance of this testimony is:
(1) that it considered Iraq as a "partner" and not a "threat" to the United States;
(2) that a year later the United States was at war with Iraq; and
(3) that the testimony was given by General
H. Norman Schwartzkopf, the field commander of the forces to defeat Iraq. The most critical task in planning the defense of a nation is judging the nature and extent of the threats which may occur, given the structure and objectives of United States national security planning. (15:243) If Iraq were not truly a "threat" to United States interests, then the destruction wreaked upon Iraq's military and civilian populace is even more egregious irrespective of substantial compliance with "the law of war."
IRAQ BECOMES THE ENEMY
Why, then, did we go to war with Iraq? Arm-chair philosophers, military strategists, and cynics may pose the following reasons for Operation Desert Storm: (1) to protect the oil in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for the United States; (2) to protect the oil in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for America's allies in Europe and Japan; (3) to liberate the Kuwaiti people from Saddam Hussein and return them to the Emir of Kuwait; (4) to rid the world of Saddam Hussein; (5) to bring peace and stability to the Middle East; (6) to justify not cutting defense spending when the "Iron Curtain" (Berlin Wall) came down and U.S. military forces were being cut; (7) to justify using U.S. military forces rather than redeploying them to the United States to be discharged into a sagging economy; (8) to take American citizens' minds off of the sagging economy; (9) to divert American citizens' attention from the Savings and Loan debacle which involved highly prominent businesses, United States Senators, and even the President's son; (10) to help improve the President's ratings in the polls; and (11) to protect Israel. (21)
WORLD PUBLIC OPINION
The "why" of Desert Storm influences other nations' views of the "how" we conducted Desert Storm. If a large segment of the world's nations view United States military action in Desert Storm to have been unnecessary (e.g., Iraq was not a threat to U.S. interests), then they will probably view our military operations (e.g., aerial bombardments) to be in violation of the law of war and other accepted principles of international law relating to armed conflict.
U.S. POLICY FORMULATION
To help understand the "why" Iraq was a "threat" to the United States, it is important to note that at a press breakfast in Washington, D.C. on July 19, 1990, before intelligence information about the Iraqi troop buildup had leaked, Secretary of Defense Cheney was asked about Iraq's "threats" to Kuwait regarding an oil dispute. Cheney replied that the United States would take seriously any threat to U.S. interests or U.S. friends in the region. (27:210)
Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. policy had been unclear toward Iraq. President Bush's administration officials had talked tough about Saddam's threats against Israel, the movement of Iraqi SCUD missile launchers closer to Israel, and Iraq's efforts to illegally import components for nuclear weapons. Yet, at the same time, the administration had thwarted congressional efforts to impose economic sanctions on Iraq or cut U.S. food assistance. (27:211)
President Bush was deeply concerned about Saddam's ability to control the oil in the Middle East. Bush, the former Texas oil man, engaged in extended analysis with his close personal advisors regarding the impact on world oil availability and price. Bush was concerned with if the U.S. and other nations could embargo Iraqi oil and if Saddam would withhold Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil or try to flood the world market and the ultimate impact on U.S. oil resources. (27:226)
There may have been many reasons why Iraq became a threat which justified devastating military action against it, or there may have been no substantially valid reason to have justified Desert Storm. History will ultimately disclose why we went to war with Iraq.
LEGALIZING THE WAR
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
President Bush did an outstanding job of unifying nations to be the coalition of forces to defeat Iraq. He was able to influence the United Nations Security Council to give an air of legitimacy to the ultimate decimation of Iraq.
The Council passed resolutions relating to condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding immediate withdrawal, and ordering a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
The Council also voted to give the United States and other naval powers the right to enforce the economic embargo and to allow limited humanitarian food aid into Iraq or Kuwait.
Most importantly, as far as internationally legitimatizing U.S. warfare in the Persian Gulf area, the Council authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991. (24:A12) (See Appendix).
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
Once the President got the approval of the United Nations Security Council to use military force against Iraq, there was only one other legal obstacle to hurdle before the United States went to war -- Congressional acquiescence.
Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis had failed -- Bush demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and compliance with all of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions. (26:36-37) Saddam Hussein tried to "link" his withdrawal of forces from Kuwait to a commitment to a Middle East peace conference to settle the festering and long-time Palestinian issue. (5:24) The U.S. should have negotiated with Saddam, but as will be discussed later, the U.S. Israeli lobby in Congress had its own agenda.
There were still questions about the President's policy in the gulf crisis -- why there? Why now? Why the United States? These questions were in Congress's emotional debate that ultimately gave Bush a de facto declaration of war. By 67 votes in the House and only 5 votes in the Senate, Congress granted the President authority to use military force in the Persian Gulf even though there were forceful arguments from Congressmen that the U.N. embargo against Iraq should be allowed more time to work. (17:16-17)
Congress supported the President after being forced to recognize that a defeat for Bush within days of the U.N. deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait would have catastrophic consequences not only for the U.S. policy in the gulf, but for the international coalition against Iraq, too. (17:17) President Bush now had all the "legal" authority he needed to wage war against Iraq. Americans like to believe they do things lawfully.
THE LAW OF WAR
THE CONVENTIONS
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims and the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land were intended to be, and are, legally binding on the United States and its citizens, especially members of the armed forces. (6:1) The policy of the Department of Defense is to ensure: (1) that the law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by the U.S. armed forces; (2) that a program designed to prevent violations of the law of war is implemented by U.S. armed forces; and (3) that alleged violations of the law of war whether committed by or against U.S. or enemy personnel are promptly reported, thoroughly investigated, and corrective action is taken if appropriate. (10:1)
The law of war is derived from two principle sources -- Lawmaking Treaties (or Conventions) such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions and custom which is a body of unwritten or customary law firmly established by the custom of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law. (12:4)
AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS
For purposes of this analysis, the provisions of the Conventions relating to bombardments will be considered.
"The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." (12:19)
Of course, defended places such as forts, defended cities with military forces present or passing through, munitions factories, military supply camps, warehouses, transportation facilities, or other places devoted to support the military operations may be attacked or bombarded whether defended or not. (12:19)
The Conventions prohibit unnecessary killing and devastation:
"... loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained. Once a fort or defended locality has surrendered, only such further damage is permitted as is demanded by the exigencies of war, such as the removal of fortifications, demolition of military buildings, and destruction of stores." (12:20)
Specifically dealing with delivery of munitions from aerial platforms, the Hague Convention of 1907 said:
"There is no prohibition of general application against bombardment from the air of combatant troops, defended places, or other legitimate military objectives." (12:20)
INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS PROHIBITED
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts prohibits indiscriminate attacks on the enemy civilian populace.
"Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objective without distinction." (9:36)
The Protocol further states what may have the most direct application to consider of the United States' aerial bombardment of Iraq:
"Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." (9:36)
Did the United States violate the spirit and intent of the law of war relating to the bombing of Iraq? To answer this question, one must consider the air campaign over Iraq and its effects. This writer believes that the massive bombing campaigns on Iraqi civilian populated areas with "dumb" munitions probably violated the aforementioned considerations relating to the law of war.
AIR CAMPAIGN
GENERAL DUGAN WAS PROPHETIC
In September 1990, then Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael J. Dugan said that a massive bombing campaign against Baghdad that specifically targeted Saddam Hussein would be the only way to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. He said "the cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad," and other targets would include Iraqi power systems, roads, railroads, and perhaps domestic petroleum-production facilities except oil fields. He also said that Saddam Hussein, himself, should be specifically targeted. (4:A14)
General Dugan went so far as to say that he asked his planners to interview academics, journalists, ex military, and Iraqi defectors to determine what was unique about Iraqi culture that they put very high value on. (4:A14)
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney explained, after relieving General Dugan of his position, that "we never talk about targeting of specific individuals who are officials of other governments." He said that such action might be a violation of the standing presidential executive order prohibiting U.S. involvement in assassinations of foreign leaders. (23:A8)
BOMBING SADDAM AND LEADERSHIP TARGETS
Eventually Operation Desert Storm commanders ordered a massive search for an American-made motor home believed used by Hussein during a 42-day campaign to hunt down and kill him. In the opening hours of the war in mid-January, Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117 stealth bombers destroyed command bunkers Saddam was using in Baghdad. After the bunkers were destroyed, Air Force planes were divided into teams and patrolled areas likely to be travelled by Saddam's mobile command center. (25:A24)
Saddam survived, but were U.S. forces violating the executive order prohibiting assassination of foreign leaders; or was it just war as usual?
An embarrassment to the U.S. Bombing effort was the destruction on the Amiriya shelter in Baghdad at the cost of several hundred civilian lives. "Leadership targets" were high priority for bombing to get the Iraqi military high command and Baath leadership to overthrow Saddam. (8:20)
The effort to get the "leadership" failed, and the allies were unprepared for the presence of so many innocent family members. One visibly shaken Pentagon source was asked if the victims were in fact dependents of Iraq's ruling elite, and he said, "I don't know. (Burned) women and children all look much the same, don't they?" (8:20)
EFFECTS OF BOMBARDMENTS
What were the overall effects of the U.S. air raids in the Persian Gulf War? Greenpeace, the environmental protection organization conducted interviews with international relief workers, reporters, U.S. officials, and news reports. Greenpeace's report said that over 150,000 people died as a result of the war with Iraq and at least 5 million lost their homes or jobs. (14:A10)
The majority of the bombing casualties were caused by "dumb" bombs and by the 12 million to 16 million bomblets released by an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 cluster bombs dropped by allied planes. (14:A10)
As much as the U.S. media (which was fed its information by the military) portrayed the "smart bombs" striking targets, the truth is that the majority of the munitions hurled on Iraq and Kuwait were "dumb" bombs. Allied jets dropped 88,500 tons of bombs on Iraq and Kuwait, but about 70 percent of them missed their targets. The precision-guided bombs, the icon of Pentagon briefings and the military's preferred image of the war, made up barely 7 percent of the U.S. tonnage dropped on Iraqi targets, said General Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff. (11:A2)
A senior Pentagon official said 81,980 tons of "dumb" or unguided bombs had an accuracy of only about 25 percent. (11:A2) It is reasonable to conclude that there was a great deal of collateral damage -- not destruction of military targets -- caused by the extensive aerial bombardments of populated cities like Baghdad.
The extent of actual unnecessary death and destruction inflicted upon Iraqi non-military targets may never be known, but suffice to say that it is impossible to have conducted the awesome aerial bombardment of Baghdad and other populated areas of Iraq and not have inflicted massive civilian casualties.
AIR FORCE POLICY
The Department of the Air Force policy is that Air Force personnel will comply with the law of armed conflict (law of war) in the conduct of military operations. (3:1)
"The mass annihilation of enemy people is neither humane, permissible, nor militarily necessary. The Hague Regulations prohibit the destruction or seizure of enemy property 'unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.' Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law, and there must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of enemy forces." (1:5-9)
Air Force policy says that collateral damage should not be excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated from the attack, and in all operations every feasible precaution should be taken to keep civilian casualties and damage to a minimum. (2:3-3)
U.S. BOMBING PROBABLY WENT TOO FAR
There have been charges that America and its allies went too far in its bombing of Iraq.
"The Washington Post... said, 'Some targets, especially late in the war, were bombed primarily to create post war leverage over Iraq, not influence the course of the conflict itself.'" (13-A16)
If one couples what the United States failed to achieve in Operation Desert Storm (e.g., to save the oil, to save the Kuwaiti people, to get rid of Saddam, and to bring peace to the Middle East) with the less than clear justification to meet "the threat" and the aerial onslaught inflicted on Iraq -- a war crimes tribunal composed of objective judges (not members of the allied coalition) might be hard - pressed to justify U.S. aerial bombardment under principles of international law.
It is probable that the war with Iraq could have been avoided if the U.S. would have considered a Middle East peace conference to discuss the Palestinian issue, but somebody needed the war. If the war was not necessary, then the bombing of the innocent civilians in the populated areas of Iraq was unnecessary; and the aerial bombardments were violations of the law of war.
CONCLUSIONS
WAR MUST BE A LAST RESORT
Before the United States goes to war, the country must be certain that the enemy is truly a "threat" to justify the awesome lethal force America can dispense to its enemies.
The American people must not allow foreign powers to use special interest groups (like American-Israel Public Affairs Committee -- AIPAC) to pressure Congress to put the American military at war. (19:A14) Israel used the U.S. to neutralize a major Arab threat in Operation Desert Storm.
UNITED STATES PROBABLY VIOLATED LAW OF WAR
Once the decision to go to war is made (and assuming it's a morally, politically, legally, and militarily justifiable decision), the United States must conduct its military operations (including aerial bombardment) in compliance with the law of war. There was much "legal talk" and "legal maneuvering" to get the United States into the war with Iraq, but there was minimal adherence to the law of war by preventing unnecessary killing and devastation.
There is no way that the United States and the allied coalition could have conducted the number of sorties they conducted on the populated areas in Iraq with the over 90 percent "dumb" munitions they used -- and not have inflicted extensive unnecessary killing and devastation. The logic is inescapable. It is highly probable that the mass aerial bombing of highly populated areas in Iraq was "indiscriminate" bombing per se; however, the public will never know because the media was restricted in its reporting of the war casualties and bomb damage assessment.
No one can criticize the outstanding execution of the battlefield operations by the American military forces, but they probably violated the law of war. Would a truly objective war crimes tribunal considering the United States aerial bombardment campaign say it complied, in all instances, with the law of war? Probably not and the U.S. government, military, and people should be concerned if America is going to go to the U.N. to get approval on future military operations.
Nations have wrestled over the decades to try to establish workable rules to govern aerial bombardments, and their efforts have been controversial and not often easy. (18:1-225) Since many of the world's nations are concerned about how aerial bombardment is conducted by belligerents, the United States needs to be concerned not only in "word" but in "deed".
WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD HAVE DONE
Should the United States have avoided armed conflict with Iraq and accepted Iraq's proposal to "link" the Palestinian homeland issue with Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait to prevent the onslaught of Iraq? Should the United States have given the coalition embargo of supplies to Iraq more time to work? Should the United States have tried to effectuate a broad peace plan in the Middle East as it is trying to do now? Should the United States have reevaluated its relationship with Israel (who had demanded a $10 billion loan guarantee and who is continuing to settle Jews in the occupied areas contrary to U.S. and U.N. wishes) a long time ago and taken a firm stance against Israel then? (16:38-39)
The answer to these questions is a resounding YES if Americans truly believe in fair play and justice and the rule of law. Students and practitioners of the art of strategy and warfare must also consider these questions and issues because it is only when "the warrior" has intellectual discipline and integrity that he will be able to live up to what Sun Tzu said:
"... Thus, those who win one hundred triumphs in one hundred conflicts
Do not have supreme skill.
Those who have supreme skill,
Use strategy to bend others without coming to conflict..." (22:45)
The fact that the U.S. conducted the aerial bombardment of Iraq as it did shows that Americans (the people, the political leaders, and the military) still have much to learn about the morality, legality, and the art of war.
APPENDIX: UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
August 3, 1990 -- Resolution 660 -- The Council voted 14-0 to condemn the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Yemen, the only Arab member of the Council did not vote.
August 6, 1990 -- Resolution 661 -- The Council voted 13-0 to order a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
August 9, 1990 -- Resolution 662 -- The Council voted 15-0 to declare Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void under international law.
August 18, 1990 -- Resolution 664 -- The Council voted 15-0 to demand that Iraq free all detained foreigners.
August 25, 1990 -- Resolution 665 -- The Council voted 13-0 to give the United States and other naval powers the right to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq and Kuwait by halting shipping to those countries. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
September 13, 1990 -- Resolution 666 -- The Council voted 13-2 to allow humanitarian food aid into Iraq or Kuwait only "to relieve human suffering", and said only the Council could decide when those circumstances existed. Cuba and Yemen voted against the measure.
September 15, 1990 -- Resolution 667 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's aggressive acts against diplomatic missions in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreigners from the buildings.
September 24, 1990 -- Resolution 669 -- The Council voted 15-0 to stress that only its Sanctions Committee had the power to permit food, medicine or other humanitarian aid to be sent into Iraq or occupied Kuwait.
September 25, 1990 -- Resolution 670 -- The Council voted 14-1 to explicitly expand its economic embargo to include all air cargo traffic in or out of Iraq and Kuwait except for cargoes of humanitarian aid specifically authorized by its Sanctions Committee. It also called on U.N. member nations to detain any Iraqi ships that may be used to break the naval embargo. Cuba opposed the measure.
October 29, 1990 -- Resolution 674 -- The Council voted 13-0 to hold Iraq liable for war damages and economic losses, to ask nations to collect evidence of grave human rights abuses by the occupying forces, to demand that the Western embassies in Kuwait City be restocked with food and water, and to demand all hostages be released. Cuba and Yemen abstained.
November 28, 1990 -- Resolution 677 -- The Council voted 15-0 to condemn Iraq's attempt to alter the demographic character of Kuwait and asked Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to take possession of Kuwait's census and citizenship records for safekeeping.
November 29, 1990 -- Resolution 678 -- The Council voted 12-2 to authorize the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait
after January 15, 1991. (24:A12)
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